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
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NOT PUBLISHED.]

19

THE

CROWN OF DENMARK

DISPOSED OF BY

A RELIGIOUS MINISTER

THROUGH

A FRAUDULENT TREATY.

WITH REPRINT OF


DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

"If you cannot save your country at least drop not your protest against the
men and measures by which it is ruined."—SHAFTESBURY.

LONDON, MARCH, 1853.

2317-7 e. 11





PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

May, 1852.

THE subjoined exposure of the scheme to set aside the Danish succession, was drawn up sixteen months ago in, as it will be seen, the full anticipation of such an event as that announced in the astounding article of the Times of the 11th. On the perusal of that article, I perceived, to my surprise, that account is taken of the opinion of this country; so I take to myself shame for the hopelessness through which these pages have hitherto lain dormant, and send them at once, and without the revision of a line, to press.


I have to make now but one remark, and it sums up the whole. The Emperor of Russia comes in, after all the Agnatic and Cognatic Lines, as HEIR GENERAL alike to Denmark and the Duchies. This no one has perceived. In the disquisitions, historical, legal, diplomatic and popular of six years, it is never once hinted at.


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Augustenburg

Gluckenburg
123456789

Treaty of 8th May.

Minor
(Elected by Treaty)

Cut out by Treaty.

Signates,

Signates
Augustenburg
Elders 3 males
Youngers 3 males.
Gluckenburg 3 males.
2 females.
15.

Hesse (Electorate) 4 males
Hesse (Landgrave) 1 male.
5.

Gothorp.

Nicolas I.
(her general)

A CROWN DISPOSED OF, &c.

Spectatum admissi, risum teneatis amici?

THE hereditary principle has ceased to be considered an element of political power; or rather is esteemed one of convulsion; we are a practical nation and draw maxims from events. A consequence of this philosophical habit is an utter indifference to the means by which these are brought about. Whether then an infuriated mob fires a cathedral, or a placid diplomatist upsets a throne, nothing is observed beyond the law of progress, or the habit of office.

It is to be hoped at least, that, in the hands of historians, mankind would be instructed in the conduct of those who have the management of public affairs; but again the spirit of generalisation interposes, both explanations are admitted, but interchangeably, the one passing into the other like dissolving views. The Gorgon head of Demo-

crazy is presented; and while you are busy tracing its features, each snake transforms itself to a quill. A gorgeous hall arises with an assembled conclave, and while you are recognising the lofty brow of a Metternich, or detecting the flattened cranium of a Thiers, the damask curtains roll into sulphurous clouds, and reveal a captured bastille; either way we have the same result, and secrecy in diplomacy converts history into fable.

There arises consequently a craving after dramatic effects: but should foreign states be languid in furnishing them, our Government busies itself in supplying the deficiency: its performances acquire a higher zest by that effectual concealment of the springs and wires, which results from ignorance in the spectators of the very existence of machinery. It is something to see a Queen of Hearts spring out of a bottle; but what is that to witnessing a crown flung into the mud, or a people sprung into the air, while the conjuror is sitting on the other side of the Channel?

In a country like England the opinion of the nation may have no action on the Government, but the fallacies of the people are accurately represented in its policy; the people of England confounding its Government's action upon a foreign people, with that people's voluntary convulsions,—that Government will reason in the same manner and act accordingly.

There might be a difficulty were the plan an original conception, but this objection is purely speculative;

a cup of coffee in the recess of a window, at the close of a dinner party, does it all.

Yet it must be said that we have done our best, and would have done otherwise had it been in us. In little more than a year, we have tried no less than five foreign secretaries; we have sought for them by beat of drum through alley and market-place—demagogue, novice, old stager, the men of safe routine, of unbiassed inexperience, have been tried in turn; we have not only sought wisdom in multitude but in discord; nevertheless, amidst the strife of faction, and the revolution of men and ideas, "Foreign policy" pursues its one undeviating course; the fictitious chaos which we have laboured to create, again and again pertinaciously resolves itself into exasperating order.

Whilst throughout the rest of Europe the foundations of society have been shaken, there is one country standing next after Poland as the barrier against Russia, and as regards maritime power, even before that State, where fortunately, up to the present time, abstract questions have never, or slightly, been mooted: consequently it afforded no opening for dissolving intrigue, and no field for insolent aggression. The Danish people, and the Danish Duchies were attached to their institutions, and preferred maintaining them against illegal usurpation, to barricading their streets or decapitating their king.

This is the country on which England is experimenting in a manner which evinces unparalleled nerve, and with an effect which cannot fail to prove highly

dramatic. The case is nothing less, if not a great deal more, than the fabrication of such a revolution as that of France, which then filled her with horror, and engaged her in a thirty years' war to put it down,—for what else, in the combustible state of the present Germany and Europe, can be the result of a foreigner attempting, and several foreigners combining, to subvert the primordial law of a State—that of its succession? There is this difference, however, as contrasted with the events in France, that Denmark is to be cast to one, or to be contended for by several of the contracting powers. England does not propose to be the acquirer, and if called upon the field of battle, can only appear there, to assert the rights which she commences by subverting.

The English Government, it is true, has indeed no evil purpose; but is consequence a necessary or an ordinary feature in the conduct of man? To plead good intentions is to plead ignorance. Abdicate then dominion. The honesty of a private man consists in a justifiable reliance on his own conscience; the honesty of an agent in the knowledge and capacity requisite to deal with the matters entrusted to his care.

No minister of a State is honest, who is not conscious to himself of faculties which enable him to cope with his antagonists;—if not, let him be still. The late Foreign Secretary and present Leader of the House of Commons, in a recent debate, after speaking of counsels which this Government had urged on the Ottoman Empire—counsels to the last degree noxious

and revolutionary, but to his mind beneficial and sane—recommends them by the assertion of England's disinterestedness. "She," he says, "has no plans hostile to Turkey—entertains no project for her dismemberment." His maxim therefore is, that good intentions promote perspicuous conclusions; but the experience of mankind bears hard the other way: it is evil purposes that render the eye penetrating, and the brain clear. However fortunate the Ottoman Empire may be in possessing the disinterested friendship of the British Cabinet, it is luckily enabled to dispense with its advice. But if the English Cabinet has no projects, it has notions: these, in Turkey limited to counsel, assume in Denmark the shape of coercion.

Evidently the English Cabinet is troubled in spirit. It is filled with some secret alarm, which bursts forth in this tumultuous manner at the opposite extremities of Europe. This it is essential to fathom; and the debate to which I have referred shortens the labour of the task. They are possessed—and they avow it, with a profound suspicion of Russia. This it is which prompts them to advise Turkey to arm its disaffected subjects, and to abstain from reducing its insurgent provinces; this it is which impels them to plunge into the intricacies of Danish and German heraldry, on which propitious field they are happy in the thought, that by a stroke of the pen they have frustrated her designs, and mastered her intelligence.

It is the afflicting reality, that every great achieve-

ment of Russian diplomacy has been accomplished by activity, prompted by fear; and each successive minister is perfidiously and cunningly planning schemes against her, whilst he dare not look her representative in the face. She acts not alone by her own agents, but through those of the various governments of Europe, thus she surrounds the Foreign Office with a commissioned atmosphere, impenetrable alike from within and from without; the helpless occupant of that perilous post is thus over-reached in proportion to his activity and discrimination; whichever way he turns, he is driven back into the net from which he had endeavoured to escape, cowed before the array of concerted power, or bamboozled by the show of simulated hostility.

It has been necessary to enter into these preliminary observations, because it would be in vain to look for the explanation of the Treaty of the 8th of May in the transaction itself.

Europe has been made to believe that the succession of the Crown of Denmark presented difficulties: the reverse will appear if we look at the case as it stood when they commenced to embroil it.

In the annexed domain, that is, the Duchies, the Female Line does not succeed; in Denmark Proper, originally elective, and consequently Male, the Female Line has, by a Royal Ordinance, been introduced; either was thus legitimate and optional: there were Princes of the ancient House in large numbers, fulfilling the one or the other condition, and

available for the succession ; whether by a separation of the Dependencies, as Hanover has recently been separated from England ; or by a union of the two. The Diets in concurrence with the Crown were possessed of the faculty of removing every obstacle. It was purely a domestic concern, and could only be dealt with by constitutional means. The Crown had been, by a national act, rendered despotic ; the plenitude of that despotism had restored the constitutional form.

But Denmark presented this peculiarity—that the Hereditary Principle led ultimately to its incorporation with Russia, the descendant of Peter III. being Heir-general to the Kingdom and the Duchies on the failure of the Royal Agnatic and Cognatic Lines. This was the point by which the succession touched Europe. The other Powers had, therefore, the deepest interest in the maintenance of the intermediary lines ; and they must above all things have desired to see an internal accommodation effected, which should alike unite the Duchies and the Kingdom, the People and the Crown. If they acted at all, their course was as easy as it was plain. It was to urge upon the King of Denmark an appeal to the Diets to settle the common succession in either the Agnatic or the Cognatic Line ; and in the latter case to obtain renunciation of the excluded branch, which for such a purpose, and so proposed, there would have been no difficulty in obtaining. The recommendation

to consult the Estates was besides one to be expected from the Governments of the West, if only in consequence of their professed constitutional opinions.

From the war between the Duchies and Denmark Europe has drawn the inference of a profound animosity existing between them, and of their mutual desire of separation. This war really arose out of the anxiety of the two people to continue to form one kingdom. Dread of Russia was in fact the impelling motive, and it will be seen in the subsequent pages how she used it to produce first the mutual schism, and then the diplomatic maxim of maintaining the integrity of the Danish Crown by its transfer to herself.

Let it be remembered that these Hereditary claims of Russia flow from an *illegitimate* daughter of Peter I. married to the heir of the line of Gottorp, whose son ascended the Russian throne by a revolution.

It is not often in the lifetime of a man, or in that of a nation, that an event of similar magnitude occurs. The great wars of Europe have, directly or indirectly, arisen from the conflict of rights dependent on territorial configuration, and those resulting from the intermarriages of regal Lines. The nations declined to be disposed of by genealogists, but their opposition was blind, and revolutionary: legislators did not arise to rectify, but armies marched against rights which they did not contest, to resist consequences they would not brook, and the plains of Europe were ensanguined and manured to bar heraldic claims, affecting a German fortress or an Italian dukedom; the case

never arose of a union of great and independent kingdoms. Since the time of Charlemagne, (that is to say, in the course of a thousand years,) the prospect of such an event has presented itself but once, and that prospect, centuries before the contingency could occur, moved all Europe as by a present danger.

The testament of Charles III. disposing of Spain to a grandson of Louis XIV., would have aroused the indignation of that country had not the revelation of the Treaty of Partition planned by William III. presented England and her allies in a still more atrocious light than France. England, though discomfited in the war which ensued, and forced to recognise Philip V., still refused to lay down arms until he on his side, and the King of France upon the other, in their own name and that of their successors, severally renounced every claim which the descendants of either might have to inherit simultaneously the two crowns. This was carried into effect, not by a Treaty between England, Holland and Austria, but by *legal instruments executed by these Monarchs*, and recorded in the Treaty of Utrecht: although that Treaty has lost its effect, having been broken by war, and not restored at the subsequent treaties of peace, these Renunciations are no less valid and binding than on the day on which they were signed.

Judging by events, so far from concluding the convulsions of Europe in this respect weakened within a century and a half, we must infer them to have been strengthened. Only seven years ago when he

power of Spain had ceased to be alarming, and after the hereditary principle in France had been swept away, Europe was all but plunged in a war, (the dynasty in France was upset) by the marriage of a princess of Spain to a junior son of Louis Philippe; yet it was at the moment of this excitement and indignation respecting the future liberties of Europe, that the first steps were taken in that scheme which was to unite the crown of Denmark to that crown by which Europe was actually menaced, and that the weak prince, then seated on the Danish throne, was persuaded that the suppression of the ancient rights of a portion of his country was necessary to preserve the integrity of his succession.

In the case of Spain the rights of Legitimacy underwent a legal modification to avert a common danger. In the case of Denmark these rights were illegally destroyed to bring that danger. They were destroyed to place another realm in the hand of a monarch who has broken through every restraint which Europe has attempted to place on his ambition—has violated the great European settlement, constituting the body of public law—whose actual realised power threatens the East as well as the West; and who by suborning the intelligence of the cabinets, and dividing the nations of Europe into hostile camps, leaves it without the means to resist any violence he may commit, or the faculty to conceive any purpose he may pursue.

Yet, after all, the issue has depended solely on the

manner of presenting the case. If instead of twenty-three heirs between the Crown of Denmark and the Emperor of Russia there had been but *one*—then most certainly measures would have been taken, in the uncertainty of the Line of Romanoff, to force the Danish heir to make an option between the two crowns. There could have been then no discussion; the matter would have been one simply of concert; Sweden, if icy and unimpassioned, would have been warmed into zeal; Prussia, if mean and subservient, startled into dignity; France, if wavering and suspicious, would have expanded into cordiality; if England appeared at the time to be preoccupied with schedule D. or the Beer Tax, impatient knockings at the Foreign Office, and echoes from the banks of the Bosphorus to those of the Tagus, must have forced an hour of reflection, and at least a whisper of assent. Then should we have seen issue to the world a London protocol, not a hoax, or a perfidy. Ay, that dreaded War—dreaded for any just, or honourable purpose, would be ready with his leash, had the heir of Gottorp (Russia) dared to show himself less tractable than the successor of Oldenburg. But unfortunately, there are twenty-two heirs too many, Russia being far off, we may cut out as many of them as we please. It is a French proverb, that nothing is more difficult than to give an answer to an unreasonable question; how then explain an incredible act?

It is not to be expected that any transaction of a diplomatic nature should be comprehensible

to an insular people; it has no charms for the agricultural, no attractions for the commercial mind; but there is an aspect of the case which an Englishman would be insulted, if supposed not to apprehend and feel. Where, in all this, is the WILL of the people of Denmark? To be ruled by our own devices is to-day the science of politics, and the test of independence. The antiquated notions of curbing rebellious passions, of guiding fallacious reason,—the visionary standard of an impracticable rule of right,—the exploded theory of laws of nature, of nations, or of God, have given place to the benigner influences of Progress, expressed in a formula, which is alike our maxim at home, and our policy abroad—"A free state is that which is governed by laws which itself has made." Reflect, judge, and answer, if it be not so. What then have you done with Denmark? Is it on this maxim that you found your right to make laws for her? If she arises in arms to resist you, will you honour her worth, or punish her rebellion? To be even wrong, a man must be consistent: you are insane.

It was recently remarked by a statesman retired from forensic perturbation, in reference to transactions in the far East, that "England is not behind the chiefest of the Russians, whenever there is a prospect of gain to be obtained by the sacrifice of principle." Is Queen Victoria, Heir-General to Denmark and the Duchies? Is it to tame that kingdom to your yoke that you are engaged in fracturing her Constitution, and in trampling down her people? Is it to qualify

her to send, at a future day, enlightened representatives to St. Stephen's, that you are protocolising the Danes into beasts of burden, and civilising with Austrian dragoons the Duchies into serfs? At least, if an English Minister in the pursuit of unlawful gain had planned a civil war in a foreign country, England would know the fact, and have it in her option to accept the acquisition, or to send the criminal to the block; but these deplorable good intentions plunges it in a gulf of hopelessness, rendering it the ready tool of every knave, and the screen of every villany.

Seek not to escape from the spectacle by adducing "France," "Austria," "Russia," &c.; the deed was signed in London,—the Civil war fomented from London—the "moral influence" was England's ships of the line: unless London had been safe, nothing could have been attempted. Austria and France are your dupes, just as you are Russia's; they are not heedless—you are: your power exerted through that heedlessness, constrains their will. The words of Prokesch have been "published and not published." "France follows England, and England is in understanding with Russia."

But after all, the matter lies in a nutshell. Let any man make the case his own. Say the succession to the *English* instead of the Danish Crown, and every ambiguity vanishes. If told that foreign Diplomats had met in a room in Paris to upset the Act of Settlement; even if with the concurrence of the

Queen, would not one burst of indignation arise from Land's End to John o'Groats? But is not your submission to such an outrage the necessary consequence of the course which you now adopt towards Denmark? Were a man of the dignity and gravity of Lord Aberdeen to assert that in such a case England must submit, would the prematurely obsolete process of impeachment not be recalled to the thoughts of this nation? If Lord Aberdeen would repudiate an act of domestic treason, he must abjure the Treaty of the 8th of May.

But, independently of the reacting of these subversive doctrines, may they not directly affect the Minister as regards Denmark? Disposing of that Crown by means of a Treaty which is not legal, does he not do the same thing as if he levied private war, and with the effect of giving an advantage to an extrinsic power, at the cost of an ally of her Majesty? This definition, if correct, is of serious import, and on both grounds exposes to the pains and penalties of High Treason.

But he may plead that the Treaty of the 8th of May was the act of his predecessors, and that if he attempted to shake it, it would be supported by the full power of the Opposition, and that he has to respect it, not merely as the act of his predecessor, but also "as the engagement of his Sovereign," whose faith is pledged to it no less solemnly than to the Treaties of 1815. I reply that the Treaty, not being a legal one, cannot be executed without incurring fresh

guilt; and having regard to contingent and prospective events, even if legal, it would be open to modification. But does the existence and execution of this Treaty prevent the negotiation of another, the necessity of which is imposed by its existence. When it was signed, attention had not been called to the position of the Emperor of Russia as Heir-General. That point of the case had, up to that moment, been kept sedulously out of view; the danger has been brought into evidence by the fact, and, indeed, may be said to have been created by it. Instead, therefore, of the Treaty of the 8th of May being a bar to farther and reparatory measures, it furnishes at once the reason, the occasion, and the necessity for taking the only course which it is open in law for foreign powers to take, namely, to prevent the union of the sceptres of Russia and Denmark in one grasp.

It is now not too much to say that the Treaty of the 8th of May was a thoughtless act obtained by an imposition* of which the then Government are now ashamed of being the dupes, or at least would have been so, had the subject not been rendered diverting, by the awkward and damaging contortions of their successors. On obtaining the signatures, M. Brunow immediately launches the article in the "Times" of the 11th May. The article is everything

* Lord Derby was led to ask—"Who is to come in *after* this new line?" The Russian diplomatist replied, "Time will show." On this Lord Derby relapsed into the normal condition of an English minister.

—the Treaty nothing; the article would have accomplished the Treaty, but for circumstances—which history will never relate—what does it ever relate?

If there is any transaction in which notoriety is requisite and obtained, it is a Treaty. This one was announced to the world with a pomp which no such transaction, at least no one arising unexpectedly and from no understood cause, has ever obtained. Whoever at present may send to No. 6, Great Turnstile, Lincoln's-Inn Fields, or No. 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, to purchase the Treaty, at the cost of a penny, would ever suspect or imagine that that Treaty remained not only an absolute secret for nearly a year, but a thing the very existence of which was denied by members of the Government by whom it had been signed. Its conditions were never published in any newspaper. The article in the "Times" (the only statement on the subject) not only misrepresents the Treaty, but falsifies the whole subject from end to end. No doubt it was the business of the interested parties to ascertain the facts and to read the Treaty: surely it was not less so for the members of the English Cabinet, or for the instructors of public opinion. It is not here a charge which I make, but a habit to which I point, the habit of ignorance on practical matters, that is to say, matters carried into practice, in other words, Russian purposes. And, indeed, it is alone out of the habit of ignorance that the habit of scheming has arisen; or, according to the Spanish proverb, "If there were no dupes, there would be no knaves."

I take to myself my full share of blame in this case. When the article in the "Times" appeared, I made inquiry for the Treaty, but could not obtain a copy. These inquiries were repeated several times and with the same result. In the mean time, however, it had been sent to the offices already mentioned in Great Turnstile, Lincoln's Inn Fields, and Abingdon Street, Westminster, the numbers of which I have already given; but I positively remained ignorant of the fact during ten months, until I learnt it from a communication to that effect made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to one of the excluded Princes, who, begging to be informed regarding the nature and conditions of the instrument by which the ancestral rights and honours of his House, the independence of his country, and his private property and possessions were disposed of, was referred to the two said offices, the henceforward memorable shops, No. 6, Great Turnstile, Lincoln's-Inn Fields, and No. 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, for the requisite information. English diplomatic correspondence is generally of a heavy description, but there are occasions upon which an English Minister can become lively, that is, when it happens that in "making up the policy of the Cabinet," there is incidentally a nation to crush, or an individual to insult.

The article in the "Times" proceeded from "authority;" the Treaty was signed on the 8th; it appeared on the 11th, and required at least two days for composition; it did not proceed from an *English*

authority; for while stamping the responsibility on Lord Malmesbury it refers all the honour and credit to others. It contains, moreover, details with which the English Government could not have been acquainted; and is conscious and urgent in matters to which that Government had only conceded a faltering and reluctant consent.

Turning from the "Times" article to the Treaty one is struck by the contrast of the premeditated and conscious point and coherence of the one, and the incoherent contradictions and studied vagueness of the other: such a composition was never before dignified with the name of Treaty, and did we not know the reverse it must have been assumed to be the production of anything save art and dexterity. It is intituled a Treaty *between* certain Powers "on the one part" and the King of Denmark "on the other part," being bipartite, it must include reciprocal obligations and stipulations; there is nothing of the sort. It limits its own character and binding power by these express terms, "an additional pledge of stability," given at the invitation "of his Danish Majesty" to the arrangements relating to the order of succession established by his said Majesty.

The arrangement to which this "additional pledge of stability" is given is stated in the preamble to be the devolution of the succession to the whole of the dominions "UPON THE MALE LINE TO THE EXCLUSION OF FEMALES;" whilst in Article First, it is stipulated that the crown shall devolve upon Prince

Christian of Glucksburg and his issue by the Princess Louisa of Hesse, the Prince being of the Cognatic* or female line, and the Princess Louisa not being a male!

The preamble states, that "the additional pledge" is given for the purpose of "the preservation of peace and the balance of power in Europe." Article First excludes the Agnates, the first on the Line, constituting the succession of Denmark an inheritance of trouble and danger to Europe. Article Second leaves the ulterior succession, after the Line of Glucksburg, to the "*further propositions* which his Majesty the King of Denmark" (what King of Denmark?) "may deem it expedient to address to them," (the high contracting parties.) And Article Third positively refers to the rights of the Germanic Confederation regarding Holstein and Lauenburg, asserting that these rights "shall not be affected by the present Treaty," a Treaty which disposes of those rights independently of the Germanic Confederation. If this be a Treaty, let the name at least be recognised as a novel invention, and as having no connection with the instruments hitherto so called, which may at times have borne the impress of perversity, but have never before exhibited those of contradiction and fatuity.

The title presents us with the Emperor of all the Russias as one of the contracting parties on the one side, as opposed to the King of Denmark on the other. The same monarch is exhibited in Article First "in concert" with the King of Denmark as a member of

* He is also of the Agnatic but a junior.

his family. While in this frame of confidence why does the document stop here : why do we not see the Emperor of all the Russias equally "in concert" with the Prince Président of France, with the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, the King of Sweden and Norway, and the Foreign Office in London? Treaty! it is Personation. Puppets are called up and signatures appended, but it is everywhere one and the same spring.*

However, the "Times" endorses the document,† and, therefore, it is a Treaty, sound, valid, and conclusive. Inquiring one day in a shop for a travelling bag of Russian leather, some domestic calf skin, slightly perfumed, was offered for my admiration and acceptance : demurring somewhat, the shopman haughtily replied : "Sir, I warrant it!" Thus it is with the British public; it must accept as the occasion may be, a "warranted" bag, or a "warranted" Treaty, from the tradesman of Bond Street, or Printing House Square. There is however this difference, that it is equally difficult to obtain a bag that is Russian and a Treaty that is not.

The pamphlet herewith reprinted was forced into type by that Article. It was of course folly and ab-

* "Since a power still barbarous commenced to take a part in the affairs of Europe and of Asia, the Cabinets and the Statesmen of Europe have become the tools with which she works."

Sir John McNeill.

† The "Times" is the sole informant of England and Europe in respect to the Danish succession; alone, of all the London press, it suppresses the protest of the Prince of Schleswig Holstein.

surdity for a single voice to raise itself against Europe's act. Do not however believe that even in this age Right has lost its power, though its strength may now reside in the manner of its use ; an Emperor of Russia may still be beaten back with a pen from the Sound as he has already been with a reed from the Bosphorus.

But it will be said that the Treaty has already borne its fruits, for the Duke of Augustenburg has made surrender. That astute individual has by a life of statesmanship,* lost two crowns, and pocketed—nothing.† I pause to ask, “ Was Lord Malinesbury worth nothing?” Some little compensation might have been made to the British Exchequer. A practical nation ought to be paid for its work ; Denmark and the Sound were surely worth more than the bare honour of scaring out of his small wits the Duke of Augustenburg and terrifying the Grand Duke of Oldenburg to death.

But what is the value of a Treaty that depends for execution on an optional bargain? And this bargain, too, a secret one ! The Duke merely sells land : and binds himself not to interfere with any dispositions which the King of Denmark might choose to make with reference to the succession to the crown—in a secret article.

All this merited success : success is, however, not a result which merit can on all occasions command. The King of Denmark fancied he had lassoed in one neck

* His daily newspaper task alone amounted to the perusal of forty-one journals, French, English, German, and Scandinavian

† The money he has got is no more than an equivalent for the magnificent ancestral property which he has surrendered.

the whole race of Oldenburg ; the Duke of Augustenburg that he had got the compensation in one bag ; it therefore was arranged that his renunciation should be *Danishwise*, effectual and complete, but *Familyward*, vague and ambiguous. That family is impressed with a just sense of the superior diplomatic talents of the Duke, no less than with a firm reliance on his often proved courage and loyalty, and would never dare to penetrate the mystery of arrangements entered into by him with the " Great Powers ;" never would they call *him* to account, far less the Great Powers. Not knowing the facts, what could they do ? Suspended like the corpse of Mahomet between confidence and expectation, they could only discover their infatuation when time and chances had alike slipped away, and they had no longer rights to stand upon, or compensation to haggle for. It is an instructive fact that even the Duke got his money only after he had made himself acceptable to the Court of St. Petersburg.

It would be awkward for the English Minister should the measures of the Duke of Augustenburg prove not to have been effectually taken. Let us suppose one of the claimants refractory, could that Minister pretend that the—let us gratify Lord Aberdeen with the word—*Treaty* of London could abrogate the rights of any individuals, or supersede the laws of any country, whether Schleswig or Kamschatka, Holstein or Timbuctoo ? How then would he deal with a protest against it ? English

Ministers are not, indeed, diplomatists, but they are gentlemen.

But this is not all, means might be adopted to coerce the intractable claimant; I refer to something more than the opening of his letters at the English post, the tracking of his steps by British policemen, insolent communications from the Foreign Office, and railing articles in the "Times." Princes like all men must live, and unlike most others will not sweep crossings, and cannot write leaders. A Prince requires a revenue, a revenue not vested in cotton mills, or puddling furnaces, but like Senators of Britain, in lands; lands of princes without armies are tangible possessions in more ways than one. So that these personages may be effectually broken down with milder anguish than the weak cry of "food," from a fainting wife or a pining child. Were such a case (not an unsupposeable one) to arise, where would redress be sought, if not at the hands of the Queen of England, at once the holder of the scales of justice, and their own natural protector by the ties of blood? She seeks explanation from the Minister: will he then attempt to play off House of Commons against Crown as he plays off Crown against House of Commons? Will he tell Her Majesty that the affair is pending, and that she cannot yet be informed; or, that it is concluded, and that information is too late? Will he deplore the perverse self-will of mankind in general, and of Denmark in particular? After all, slippery as may be the ground, and with resignation or expulsion at the

end of the lane, still this is better than facing—a crushing invective, or a hostile majority? no!—a Russian ambassador.

We have not exhausted possibilities. The persuasive process having failed with lands, may be carried a step further. A crown is at stake. That circlet, even when not exposed as a prize to ambition, has caused rivers of human blood to flow; how many streams have those mute emblems cost which the Kremlin already holds;—which of them can weigh against that of Denmark? Seven individuals of that Line, preparatory victims, have either drained the bowl, or felt the knife. Will one life now interpose between the monster and his prey? Should that blow be struck, will Lord Aberdeen, on his dying pillow, find breath to shriek: “I am no assassin!”

“A first crime inoculates,” says Machiavelli, “an endless series of un contemplated crimes.” A first heedlessness in responsible station, instils in like manner a virus, which will break out on all the members, and finally settle on the heart;—it may show itself, too, in morbid fortunes, and in putrid fame. This is the least deplorable of its consequences; should the secret disease invest itself with the halo of hectic health, then the very air is polluted; and nations breathe the infection.

The game is Russian: the play, English: being upon the same line, both must equally cultivate perfidy and cowardice in the members of these devoted families; the interest is indeed more immediately

English, it being the British minister who would be incommoded by their possessing honour, or evincing character. It is not to St. Petersburg that the victims of persecution will rush: it is not the Nestor of Russian diplomacy whose equanimity will be shipwrecked between the rocks of conscience and the shoals of office; it is not from his lips that will distil the milk of sourness, or the honey of insanity;* it is not the chief of the House of Romanoff who will have to writhe under a family insult, or to cower under a Cabinet incubus. On the banks of the gelid Neva no scandalous exhibition will be made of heretical honesty, and insolent worth. In the great temple of the Sarmatian Moloch nothing disturbs the absorption of faith or the solemnity of worship: secular cares devolve on the ministering priests of the subsidiary chapel of Downing Street.

The experience of the English Government may have rendered it fool-hardy; the constitutional practice of brow-beating having hitherto entailed but small domestic inconvenience. An Italian, a German, or a Spaniard, though a king, a queen, or an emperor, was after all a mere foreigner, and could always be disposed of by an Admiral, if not by a despatch. Could it enter into the mind of any visionary that the little personages on the Baltic should dare not to be crushed. They had not even a territory to confiscate like a Rajah of Sattara, or a treasury to plunder like an Ameer of Scinde. One element, however, has been neglected.

* Il. i. v. 450.

They were not vague and outlandish existences. We have heard much that was nonsensical about Anglo-Saxon blood. Here it has value, and is overlooked : yet it will be proved that a minister that can with impunity bully an imperial sceptre, and strip an oriental monarch, will, with all Europe at his back, find it a hard matter to deal atrociously with persons who can familiarly knock at doors in certain streets, squares, and lanes, and narrate the daily incidents of his insolence or fatuity in the English tongue. If a Russian ambassadress could rule the society of London and Paris, during a quarter of a century, surely a couple of English ladies could upset the Czar and all his myrmidons, whether cabinet ministers or Baskirs, if they had an end in doing so. The Treaty of the 8th of May, the most audacious imposition which she has ever practised, may turn out to be the worst morning's work she has ever performed ; for it is of all events that have ever occurred, the one most likely to awaken sympathy, and to furnish the occasion for developing that feeling new and delightful of political action.

The Government, however, considering only its broadsides and moral influence, proceeded loftily on its lordly course, withdrew its habitual and commonplace agents at Copenhagen, and appointed new ones possessed of vigour and dexterity sufficient in their judgment to put a finishing hand to the matter, and stop the inconvenient rappings at Argyll House.

But it may well be asked what there was further

to do at Copenhagen? EVERYTHING. The Treaty indeed tells you that the dispositions of the King of Denmark have already been taken, but the King of Denmark has no power to dispose of the succession of the Duchies, no more than he has of the territorial rights of those fractions exchanged for the counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, constituting the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and which revert to the Agnatic Line, on the failure of the male successors of Frederick III. Nor has he the faculty of disposing of the Crown of Denmark, for he has surrendered his absolute power, and consequently the intervention of the Diet is required to give colour to any disturbance of the order of succession. This Treaty therefore commenced with the statement of a falsehood, by which indeed the late administration in England was deceived, but regarding which the present Administration are fully informed. Their object is now to obtain a measure to cover the flaw of the Treaty, and the means employed to force this act on the Diet is—the existence of the Treaty. The Danish Minister in proposing it on the 10th of March represented it as *imposed* upon them by a “*European Necessity*.”*

* “At the opening of the Reichstag at Copenhagen on the 10th March, the Prime Minister read the Royal Address of the 8th October last, respecting the regulation of the succession. As the Ministry presumed that the proposed succession was the right one, it would not admit of any alteration, as that would appear as if the king intended to break the engagements he had contracted with the Great Powers. To show to the Diet the opinion of Foreign Cabinets

If the measure be carried, let me ask what validity can attach to an act thus surreptitiously obtained? The Powers concur in a Treaty which is to be a pledge of security for an internal arrangement stated to have been already entered into; and then this Treaty is produced as a menace to constrain the adoption of this arrangement. Meanwhile, the secret renunciation obtained from the Duke of Augustenburg is published and under the form of a "family renunciation" on the part of the Agnates. The Treaty announces that the concurrence of the nearest Cognates has been obtained, so that the opposition of the Diet is handed over to the hopelessness of finding representatives to assert and to maintain the rights of the nation.

But this measure is not new; it has been once already presented and *rejected*. The Diet was thereupon dissolved. The eyes of Denmark are beginning to be unsealed. The mystification of Russian "renunciation" is being replaced by the suspicion of "Russian reservations," and, consequently the furor of "Denmark to the Eyder," gives place to the terror of "Russia to the Sound." But resources analagous are evolved. One refractory Diet has been dissolved, now if necessary an impracticable constitution *will be abrogated*. Splendid results of constitutional diplomacy!

But it required not many months' experience of office for the veteran instinct of Lord Aberdeen to

of the former discussions, he would lay all the correspondence on the table by which it would be seen that the unconditional approval of the motion was a European Necessity."—*Altona Mercury*.

detect the embarrassments that would arise from carrying out, in defiance of the heirs, a Treaty in which the concurrence of the heirs was positively assumed, and without which it could have no legal value ; consequently, scarcely a week elapsed before he attempted (they being still in ignorance of the deeds and the arrangements) to compromise them into a virtual surrender, by proffering the honour of a presentation to the Queen ; by means of which they were to be represented as adhering to the still secret compact made with the Duke of Augustenburg.

Ere Russia was bold, and Prince Christian of Glucksburg had become the happy object of selection, it was proposed that the succession should fall on a Prince of another Line, who held in precarious tenure a Duchy provisionally ceded to Russia by the King of Denmark, in exchange for her generously resigned claims on the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, namely, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. But this helpless dependent had positively the courage to say, that he would not allow himself to be made an object of preference at the expense of the rights of others. The moderation of Russia was excessive, to a fable ; for the Grand Duke of Oldenburg is a *junior* branch of the Gottorp Line. Still it is surpassed by her modesty, for the circumstance lies buried in oblivion. The solution of the enigma it is not my province to attempt ; the fact, however, proves that there may be Oldenburgs who are not Augustenburgs. It does not however stand alone.

Next to the Duke of Augustenburg stands his brother, having the same Agnatic claims on the Duchies, and Cognatic claims on the Crown. He has signed no compact. That with the Duke of Augustenburg has therefore the sole effect of transferring to him the representative rights of the family, placed in the utmost evidence of which the transaction is capable by the arrangement come to with him. If he had allowed himself to be included in this agreement, or had been so easily disposed of as the Duke imagined, the Treaty would have been carried into effect quietly, and unobtrusively; never would a voice have been raised until the catastrophe came. On the hoisting of the Russian standard at Elsinore, there might have been an explosion of impotent rage, but the fault would have been laid on the stars, and on those obsolete and antiquated feudal rights, so incompatible with the spirit of our age, and the genius of our institutions. The English Ministry till then would have reposed on their couch of down, and they and England would have been equally unconscious that they ever had had any thing to do in the matter. If any querulous opponent got up in the House,—if a successor of peculiar and fervid idiosyncrasy had dreamt of inscribing a tablet to immortality on the rescued portals of the Sound, after setting up a dynasty and liberating an ocean—what would have been the fate of the criticism or the design? Splendid materials, indeed, to work with—a compact of empires to be shattered; a broil of brothers to be composed; a falling State to be propped up; a

Muscovite Czar to be beaten, by means of rights of which the representatives had hastened to despoil themselves, so soon as they were assailed, and to dispose of like a musty wardrobe,—a cheap bargain in a dirty alley. It requires, not only pretensions unresigned, but pretenders irreproachable; we want the men as well as the cause—men fit to succeed, and worthy of success, and this we owe no less to the surrender of the one brother than to the protest of the other.

The Duke of Augustenburg, however, has sons. They are young. They may have derived advantage from the tortuous experience they have already passed through, and its consequences. In the meantime, their existence is not one of the smallest elements of success. Had the Prince of Schleswig-Holstein Noer stood next in succession, his conduct might have been noble and generous, courageous and self-devoted—but that would not then have appeared. Many lives of boundless disinterestedness have worn, through circumstances deemed happy by the world, the cloak of calculating interest, and the mask of cunning ambition. It belongs to but few amongst those called upon to play a great part in which they are themselves sharers, to stand so fair with fortune and with fame, as that no taint can be affixed to their purposes; but, how great is the advantage to the interests, and in this case the nations, at stake on the result, to possess an advocate combining by station and descent the right to be heard, and equally excluded thereby from the temptation to be

ambitious. Here is the lever, the point of which is now inserted into that parchment bond defiled with the ink of many nations, and loaded with the dishonour of the statesmen of Europe; and it will not break. Its fulcrum is the heart of every honest man, whatever his capacity; for, thank God, as yet the faculty subsists of appreciating courage that is not wild, and firmness that is not interested.

Thus the honour of the Line is retrieved, and a standing place of public right secured. Now just ambition and justifiable hope may mature its plans, or indulge in its expectations. At all events, for the English Cabinet perseverance is no longer blind or excusable—it is no longer easy or safe: if they do persevere, it must be by a deliberate and a strong conviction worthy of a better cause.

But who are your allies in this compact; or how do you stand with them as to matters of business? You have protested against the violation of the Treaty of Vienna in Cracow. Your Minister has authoritatively announced another violation of the Treaty of Vienna, by the establishment of the Russian quarantine at the mouths of the Danube. The same power has violated the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, by forcing from Turkey the surrender of that island upon which the quarantine is established. I restrict myself to these three infractions of public law by the Government who has proposed to you this Treaty and is to profit by it; and I ask if this and similar acts are not the legitimate consequence of holding any relations whatsoever with that Government? If no Treaty can or

does in law or right exist between Russia and England, in consequence of her past acts, can any Treaty which you now enter into with her be more valid than these violated compacts? And what is to be said of the men who continue under such circumstances to treat with her? When Catherine II. proposed a new Treaty to Kien Lung, his Mantchu Majesty replied, "Let her learn first to observe the old." But, alas, when she turns her face to the setting sun, she catches no Tartars.

But there is still one hope—a lingering hope which has clung to me through disheartening vicissitudes. Every constitution in its foundation has possessed an original germ and fibre; and decay of its equivalent,—mismanagement, results not so much from the introduction of evil novelties as from the obscuration of its inherent light, and the disturbance of its severally balancing and compensating functions. The suppressed element in our present state is the Regal one; still it subsists; it may be evoked. This is no hypothesis. On two signal occasions within a couple of years, we have seen the Prerogative exerted; once in the appointment of a Ministry; once by the coercion of the Foreign Department.

In the first case (the second in point of time), the Minister to whom the important experiment was entrusted, failed to perceive its bearing, and consequently the means of its execution. I refer, however, to the fact, not to the failure. In the second, something more was revealed than power latent in the Crown; there was also manifested ability and *courage* in the Sove-

reign. The Queen had detected, even in matters within her own knowledge, that she had been overreached by the Minister, up to that time her sole guide and instructor.

On this she negotiated with the Chief Minister to obtain that she should no longer be exposed to deception by his subordinate. On the repetition of the offence, that subordinate was excluded from the Cabinet, and the Queen required (for the fact could not otherwise have occurred) the Prime Minister to produce in Parliament, the document consigning the previous compact. The people of this country might then have learned that in the Crown they possessed a check upon faction, and in the Queen a defence against malversation. The experiment again failed; again has that Minister been forced upon the Crown by colleagues who, in excluding him from the Foreign Department, avow their concurrence with the Queen in their judgment of his character.* But again I refer to the fact and not to the experiment.

Now, this Minister is the man who planned the Treaty of the 8th of May, without whose concerted activity or measured inaction, neither could Denmark have been compromised against the Duchies, nor the Duchies against Denmark, Prussia and Germany involved in the war, or the war itself prolonged until the

* "Where he is, he can do no harm;" such is the consolation of his colleagues, when they have resigned to him the Post Office, through the instrumentality of which, even when not directly under his control, he obtained in former years the exclusion or "descent" of Lord Grey from office. But wherever that minister is, he must of necessity become every thing.

occasion was afforded for that restoration of the integrity of the Monarchy which we have before us. Is it to be supposed that these transactions had no share in the judgment and act of the Queen? is it safe for a subsequent Minister to pursue a scheme planned under such auspices, to the persecution and downfall of Princes of the House of Guelf, and no less connected with her Majesty by the ties of blood, than England is connected with them by those of interest?

What, if it did apply, would be the value of the argument—"Sanctity of Treaties." With what wonder would such words, issuing from the lips of an English Minister, be listened to by the Rajahs of India, the Ameers of Scinde, the chieftains of Affghanistan, the Shahs of Persia, the nobles of Poland, and the burghers of Cracow. Shall the Dukes and Princes of the Baltic receive as a holy word that which the rest of the world knows to be a lie? Or are they treated exceptionally, not being barbarians. Yes! there barbarism—here civilization, justifies perfidy. England is equally dexterous at keeping and at breaking words—breaking that fairly pledged in honour, keeping that filched from her by fraud; but true in both to a simple rule—the service of the Czar.*

A word of advice now, not to the wise, but

* When there is difficulty in higher quarters, the Emperor himself is brought forward; and it is understood that rising suspicions in the Queen's mind in respect to the Eastern objects of Russia were on the occasion referred to, set at rest, by a *revelation*, illustrated by the effect on the Roman Empire of the removal by Constantine of the capital to the seat of central dominion.

to the simple. Russia is a monster that devours ; but it is one also which exists only by its voracity. Around its den it has thinned the hunting grounds, and it has long remained with spring too short to reach, and growl too fierce to allure. It then got keepers, who, in dread of being devoured themselves, began to foray for its wants. Of those keepers, the individuals called "Foreign Ministers" in England have been the most venturesome and persevering. "What now is to be done with the monster?" exclaims the simple and agitated mind. The answer is easy: Starve it; cease to heap its trough with lacerated laws—cease to cast fractured sceptres and diadems into its sty, and like the wolf, it will die in silence, nor startle even an abigail with a growl.

I make a last appeal to the Minister. I will not do so on the grounds of the interests of England, because his public life is before me; I will not do so on those of fame, for judicial blindness overspreads the land; I will not do so on those of expediency, for he is a man above considerations of private interest. I believe him to be sincere; I believe him to be patriotic; but I have no hopes from his sincerity, or his patriotism. My appeal is to his heart—for he has a heart—and the occasion is one where brain is not required.

At length a religious man is Minister in England. A religious man does not "do evil that good may come." Assume that the Treaty is to strengthen Denmark against Russia, then I ask—"Will you spoliage and coerce, even to save the Sound?"

We are told to "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's;" but surely a religious man's conscience belongs, not to his office but to his Maker.

I resume :—The Treaty cuts out the heirs to such an extent, and in such a manner, that the prospective inheritance of Russia will give her, from the moment of its execution, an influence amounting almost to possession. With Denmark she acquires the Sound and the Baltic, and Sweden can no longer stand as a substantive power.

But to the Crown of Denmark is now added, by an assumed principle of the Treaty of the 8th of May, the Duchies forming the base of the Scandinavian peninsula, and cutting into Germany, one of them being an ancient fief of the Empire, and an actual member of the Germanic Confederation; so that she simultaneously acquires the old battlefield of Northmen and Germans, the passage through the Eyder from the Baltic to the North Sea, the mouths of the Elbe, the position of Rensburg, linked with all the railways of Germany, whence she can pour and distribute her troops at pleasure throughout the central portions of Europe.*

These positions contained, like those of the Dardanelles, a latent aggressive power of which Europe has remained unconscious, because in the hands of an inoffensive State. They are now about to be acquired

* The effect of Railway communication in a military point of view, and the consequent control obtained by Russia over Germany, has already begun to excite attention. See appended note from the *Wehr Zeitung*.

by her without the cost of one drop of blood, and as far as Europe is concerned, they are resigned to her without the labour of one moment's thought.

She has achieved this success in London. One Ministry, uninformed, rashly acceded to her proposal; another has come into office, which, perfectly informed, deliberately purposes to carry it out by urging the Danish Diet to pass an act to give colour of validity to an inoperative Treaty.

I will not conclude without stepping beyond the limits of mere criticism, nor leave to inference the means of rectification. There are two courses now open to the English Government;—the first, (the only fair and honourable one,) that of revising an act obtained by fraud, concluded under misapprehension, and invalid in its terms. Nothing has been ostensibly done under it, it professes to be nothing more than a pledge to the stability of arrangements made by the King of Denmark in reference to the succession to the Crown, and so excludes in its own terms all binding power.

The second course is but an expedient. It is to pass by the Treaty of the 8th of May, leaving it to take its course; and to proceed to a negotiation, with the object of obtaining mutual renunciations on the part of Denmark and of Russia, so as to prevent the union of the two crowns upon the same head.

Both courses, however, equally involve the presence in the Government of England of faculties and character which shall put an end to her subserviency. With less than this, nothing can be obtained.

(Note to page 39.)

ON THE MILITARY RAILWAYS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

From the *Wehr Zeitung*.

"The construction of the lines of railway from Moscow to St. Petersburg, and from Odessa to Warsaw, has totally altered the conditions upon which the Russian army has hitherto been dependent, and must henceforth exercise an all powerful influence upon our preparation for extensive military campaigns. The active army, consisting of four great corps of Infantry, is garrisoned in Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia. Between these forces and St. Petersburg is placed, at Novgorod, the great Grenadier Corps, while the famous guard is stationed at the capital itself. The Fifth Infantry Corps is spread in the south-west, leaning upon the extreme garrison of Pruth. The Sixth Infantry Corps occupies Moscow and its environs. Hitherto in case of a western war the active army alone could have taken an early part in the campaign, since it required months to move up the more distant troops. The completion of the railway from St. Petersburg to Warsaw will enable this movement to be effectually performed within eight days! Before one single line of the Russian railways was decided upon, the routes that would be preferable were chosen from the consideration of their relative importance in the transport of great masses of our army and its *matériel*. Some thousands of cars, specially constructed for military uses, have already been completed; a portion of them are being distributed, and the accommodation which they offer might serve as a model. Care has been taken to provide stowage for baggage, arms, saddlery, &c. With the assistance of these new appliances, one half the corps of Grenadiers and Guards could be transported to Poland in three days, and the entire corps within eight, while at the same moment the reserves would be rolling to St. Petersburg from Moscow, and the Sixth Corps of Infantry could follow if the necessity should arise. Whether the Fifth Army Corps should approach from the west would be decided by the political situation of Turkey. Whatever circumstances might arise, the army, detached, so to say, from the soil, would be enabled to act freely.

"The whole bearing, political and military, of our railway distribution consists in the possibility of transporting in a few days bodies of troops for whose transit months were previously necessary.

"With St. Petersburg and Moscow united to Warsaw, and Warsaw to Odessa, Russia immediately approaches the politics of Europe, and she will have no cause to fear in future the hesitations and delays which caused such loss of ground during the earlier portion of the war in 1831."

THE DIPLOMATIC CYCLE.

THE golden cycle, which gives us the recurrence of the obscurations and occultations of the moon, consists of eighteen years and a half; the diplomatic cycle bringing back the periods of nodes and eclipses, seems to range to four-and-twenty, judging by the apparent time at the meridians of Copenhagen and Constantinople. The conjunction actually exhibited from the former, was visible from the latter in June 1829, as will appear from the following extracts from the tables of the astrologers, dated House of Lords, 19th June 1829:—

“ Marquis of Clanricarde—The noble Earl (Aberdeen) laid great stress upon the fact of the Emperor of Russia having waived his rights as a belligerent in the Mediterranean, *as affording facilities for the execution of the Treaty of London* (6th June, 1827). All that we are yet acquainted with is, that Turkey is in danger, and that the Emperor of Russia has broken his engagements with impunity,” &c. &c. &c.

“ Lord Aberdeen—It is quite enough for Government to have it on their hands *to execute the Treaty*, without being obliged to *prophecy how it is to be executed*. *I have never given any opinion as to this Treaty.*”

TREASON OF THE HOUSE OF AUGUSTENBURG.

Since the English Government have ascertained that the Prince of Schleswig Holstein will not yield, an expedient has been resorted to to close the door against his appeal for justice and protection. He is represented as a traitor. In other times such an insinuation would have been weak, but in our days when an insinuation is better than a charge, it is a clever device.

His late Danish Majesty before his accession to the throne bore arms against his sovereign. He erected himself into an independent monarch; and so breaking the allegiance of Norway defied even a European Treaty. The then king conceived that the act justified his exclusion from the succession, and he therefore submitted the case to the Privy Council; the objection was there overruled by a formal decision, and he ascended the throne as Christian VIII.

Prince Frederick of Schleswig Holstein took a leading part on the outbreak in the Duchies, but did not, as the Duchies did not, either abjure his allegiance or attempt measures hostile to the authority of the crown. He communicated directly with the king, (then in the hands of a mob faction at Copenhagen,) proposing to concert measures with him to preserve his authority without violating the rights of the Duchies, and to rescue them from the German dema-

gogues. Whether his conduct was judicious or the reverse is here immaterial; he acted in the midst of alarms and misjudgments of which we can to-day form no due estimate.

The collision between Denmark and the Duchies was not put down as a rebellion but concluded by Treaty; consequently no character of rebellion can attach to the parties concerned.

In that Treaty Foreign Powers are parties. To treat any of the individuals taking part in those hostilities as guilty of treason is to imply a similar quality in the crowns of Great Britain, Prussia, and Austria.

The Duke of Augustenburg is similarly situated as regards these transactions to his brother.* The Duke of Augustenburg has been paid a million and a half of dollars, whether in compensation for his property or for the surrender of his rights. This money would certainly not have been paid if the cheaper process of a legal procedure, whether by impeachment or attainder, could have been attempted. This money was according to German practice invested (though in funds) as a hereditary fief, following consequently the line of succession to his male heirs, and after them to his brother and his heirs, and therefore the surrender is made in the name of the "family," no distinction being drawn between the Elder and the Junior branch;

* With this distinction, that the Duke of Augustenburg adhered to the cause after, under the commissioners sent from Frankfort, the rights of the Crown were assailed.

and in like manner the compensation is made to both branches.*

The resistance made in the Duchies was to the revolutionary movement in Copenhagen, and not to the king, and it was mainly determined by an autograph letter of the King of Prussia to the Duke of Augustenburg, urging him to that course, and assuring him of the energetic support of Prussia and the Princes of Germany in the maintenance of his undoubted rights. Subsequently a similar autograph letter was addressed to Prince Frederick of Schleswig Holstein, conveying the insignia of the highest military order of the Prussian Monarchy.

Finally, the penalties consequent on the commission of any crime can take effect only after arraignment and condemnation.

On these various grounds, too strong to require comment, it must be evident that the object of the insinuation was to poison the ear that might otherwise have been open to reason and to justice. I do not deal with it as defending the Prince, but as exposing the heinous means which this confederacy does not shrink from using; and its contempt for those upon

* This settlement has subsequently been broken through by an ordinance of the King of Denmark of the 13th of January, which takes off the entail, and, therefore, leaves unreservedly the disposal of the whole sum to the present Duke; so that he may cut off his own sons. The date of the transaction shows, however, that it was decided upon after the views of the Prince of Schleswig Holstein were known.

whom it acts, as shown in the absurdities it can rely on for effecting its essential ends.

Nothing is changed, and no new discovery has been made since it was proposed to present to Her Majesty, together with the Duke of Augustenburg, the son of the Prince of Schleswig Holstein, except indeed that the honour proffered in this fashion was declined ; so that those whom it is proposed to-day that Her Majesty should honour, by admjitting to her presence, are next day denounced to Her Majesty as traitors because they have refused.*

* The presentation was to have been together with the Duke of Augustenburg, publicly received by Her Majesty after he had made surrender ; and the conjoint presentation was to have involved that surrender of his brother which they had apprehended directly to propose.

TREATY
RELATIVE TO THE SUCCESSION
TO THE
CROWN OF DENMARK.

Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Prince President of the French Republic, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Sweden and Norway, on the one part, and the King of Denmark on the other part, relative to the Succession to the Crown of Denmark.

Signed at London, May 8, 1852.

[Ratifications exchanged at London, June 19, 1852.]

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY AND INDIVISIBLE TRINITY.

PREAMBLE. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Prince President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, taking into consideration that the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the balance of power in Europe, is of high importance to the preservation of peace, and that an arrangement by which

the succession to the whole of the dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark, should devolve upon the male line, to the exclusion of females, would be the best means of securing the integrity of that Monarchy, have resolved, at the invitation of His Danish Majesty, to conclude a Treaty, in order to give to the arrangements relating to such order of succession, an additional pledge of stability by an act of European acknowledgment.

ARTICLE I. After having taken into serious consideration the interests of his Monarchy, His Majesty the King of Denmark, with the assent of His Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, and of his nearest Cognates, entitled to the succession by the Royal Law of Denmark, as well as in concert with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Head of the elder branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, having declared his wish to regulate the order of succession in his dominions, in such manner that, in default of issue male in a direct line from King Frederick III. of Denmark, his Crown should devolve upon His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and upon the issue of the marriage of that Prince with Her Highness the princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, by order of Primogeniture, from male to male; the High Contracting Parties, appreciating the wisdom of the views which have determined the eventual adoption of that arrangement, engage by common consent, in case the contemplated contingency should be realized, to acknowledge in His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and his issue male in the direct line by his marriage with the said Princess, the right of succeeding to the whole of the dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark.

ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Parties, acknowledging as permanent the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, engage to take into consideration the further propositions which His Majesty the King of Denmark may deem it expedient to address to them, in case (which God forbid) the extinction of the issue male, in the direct line, of His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, by his marriage with Her Highness the Princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, should become imminent.

ARTICLE III. It is expressly understood that the reciprocal rights and obligations of His Majesty the King of Denmark, and of the Germanic Confederation, concerning the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, rights and obligations established by the Federal Act of 1815, and by the existing Federal right, shall not be affected by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE IV. The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the other Powers, and to invite them to accede to it.

ARTICLE V. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of six weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the eighth day of May, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two.

(L.S.)	MALMESBURY.	(L.S.)	BILLE.
(L.S.)	KUBECK.		
(L.S.)	A. WALEWSKI.		
(L.S.)	BUNSEN.		
(L.S.)	BRUNNOW.		
(L.S.)	REHAUSEN.		

ARTICLE OF THE TIMES.

MAY 11th, 1852.

It is a fortunate circumstance for the Earl of Malmesbury that, within the short period that he has held the seals of the Foreign Office, he has already had the opportunity of signing a Treaty with all the great Powers which *restores peace* to an important part of Northern Europe, *secures the integrity* of the Danish monarchy, and *provides* upon a safe basis and by an equitable compromise *for the eventual succession to that Crown*. But, in fact, this question had been so fully considered for the last few years, and the negotiations had already been so actively carried on in all parts of Europe, that, upon the arrival of M. de Bille, the Danish Plenipotentiary, in London, *nothing remained to be done* BY THE CONFERENCE *but to complete its work by signing the instruments already agreed upon*. This act was concluded on Saturday, the 8th of May, at the Foreign Office, and, as the Treaty was immediately forwarded to Copenhagen for ratification, it may now be considered that every part of this *harassing controversy* is brought to a close, and that the future peace of the country is secured, while the causes of past irritation and hostility are removed. For nearly six years the question of the Danish succession in the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein has disturbed the tranquillity of Northern Europe, for it was in 1846 that the late King of Denmark published his letters patent on the order of inheritance in the Duchies. But the *train had long before been laid* by the intrigues of the Augustenburg family, and the explosion was *greatly assisted* by the convulsions which soon afterwards took place in Germany, followed by the temporary ascendancy of revolutionary principles at Frankfort and Berlin. We need scarcely remind our readers, that throughout the chances and perils of this difficult period, *we never despaired* for an instant of a cause which was supported by the whole authority of public law, and defended by

the spirit of the Danish people. The odds against them were overwhelming, but right has prevailed. Denmark owes her success to no Foreign Power, for throughout the contest she received no active military or naval succour. But she had the goodwill and the respect of Europe ; she was upheld by public opinion, to which, we trust, we may have in some degree contributed ; and *when* at length Lord Palmerston *was induced to lay down* the principles which were established on the 2nd of August, 1850, by the Protocol of London, the rights of Denmark were saved.

It will be remembered that the cause of this dispute was, that in the probable event of the failure of issue to the eldest male line now reigning in Denmark, the several dominions of that Crown *would pass*, according to different laws of succession, and the monarchy *would consequently* have been divided. Denmark Proper would have descended through a female branch to the Princes of Hesse Cassel ; Holstein would have followed the strict line of male succession, because it was a fief of the German Empire ; and the succession of Schleswig was disputed, one party contending that it followed the descent of the Crown of Denmark, the other that it was indissolubly united to Holstein. *To meet these difficulties, the course which has now been successfully adopted was to select one scion of the Royal family as its common heir ; to obtain renunciations of the conflicting and collateral interests of all other parties, and to place the whole of these arrangements under the collective sanction of Europe.* The next heir to the Crown of Denmark, in the event of the King's demise without issue, is His Majesty's uncle, Ferdinand, a Prince of sixty years of age, married, and likewise without issue. On his death it is presumed that the reigning line will become extinct. The present treaty, therefore, recognises as the next heir after him *Prince Christian*, of the line of Sonderburg Glucksbourg, who is married to Princess Louise of Hesse Cassel, a grand-daughter

of King Frederick VI. of Denmark, by the eldest daughter of that Sovereign, who became the wife of Landgrave William of Hesse. The issue of the marriage of Prince Christian and the Princess Louise of Hesse consists of four children, the eldest a boy about nine years old; *and this young Prince, therefore, represents both the male and the female line of succession to the Kingdom and the Duchies, THOUGH not in the first degree.* The line of Augustenburg is senior to the line of Sonderburg Glucksbourg, *but it is attained for the part it took in the late contest, which was mainly fomented by those Princes in order to secure and extend their own exclusive pretensions by the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy.* The Duke of Augustenburg has, therefore, forfeited his rights, *and stands excluded from the amnesty; BUT* an arrangement has now, *we believe, been concluded between him and the King of Denmark, by which his estates in the Duchy of Schleswig are to be purchased at a high valuation, and the proceeds will suffice to provide liberally for his subsistence and station.* No further difficulty is, therefore, to be apprehended in that quarter, and it is *comparatively immaterial whether his renunciation has taken place.* But the elder members of the Hessian branch *had undoubted rights to the Crown of Denmark, which they have honourably renounced in favour of the husband and children of the Princess Louise, without exacting any compensation.* The Emperor of Russia, as representative of the line of Holstein Gottorp, had rights on one portion of the Duchy of Holstein; for the act of cession, confirmed and executed by the Grand Duke Paul, on his coming of age, in 1773, was exclusively in favour of the male line reigning in Denmark, and in the event of the extinction of the male line that renunciation so made by the father of the present Emperor Nicholas would have become null and void. *Far from shewing any eagerness to avail himself of this circumstance to acquire a preponderating influence in that part*

of Europe, IT IS DUE to the Court of Russia TO STATE that they have never attempted to sacrifice the general welfare of the Danish monarchy to any petty interest, and that the Emperor has been constantly foremost in promoting this negotiation, of which a renewal of his father's cession of all claims on Holstein forms an essential part. Throughout this transaction Russia has acted with great judgment (!) and good faith, and, although her own interests are deeply involved in all that concerns the entrance to the Baltic, she has sought to gain no advantage for herself, but simply to strengthen and preserve the independent rights of Denmark. In like manner France, under the successive Governments of Louis Philippe, Lamartine, Cavaignac, and Louis Napoleon, has pursued the same frank and consistent line of conduct towards Denmark. The difficulties came, as is well known, from the side of Germany, for this question was curiously intermingled with the political passions of the time, and the song of "*Schleswig-Holstein mecrumschlungen*" was for many months the *Ca ira* of the German revolution. At length, however, the restoration of the legitimate federal authority in Frankfort terminated the hostilities in the Duchies; and, in spite of the scorn and resentment with which our announcement of the Danish Protocol of 1850 was received in Germany, when the Prussian Envoy in London declined to sign that document, we have now great satisfaction in recording the fact, that all differences of opinion between the great Powers have disappeared, and that Chevalier Bunsen himself has placed his name by the side of the Plenipotentiaries of all the other Powers in this final arrangement! We may, therefore, now invoke his high testimony to the soundness of the policy which that Protocol was intended to establish; and if any sacrifices have been made by Prussia before she arrived at that conclusion, we sincerely hope she may be rewarded for them by the establishment of a cordial alliance between herself and Denmark

whose geographical position and maritime power make her a neighbour of the *utmost value to the Prussian dominions*. Upon the whole, this Treaty is another proof that in spite of the *most serious obstacles* and *the most violent passions*, the active, intelligent, and pacific diplomacy of our day does contrive to avert the calamities of general war, and even when hostilities are raging, to confine them, as far as possible, within a narrow compass! In any other age, it is highly probable that the Danish struggle would have led to far more formidable results (!) and, although it was too long protracted, *because vigorous means were not early employed to check it*, the termination of the whole negotiation proves that the great Powers will see justice done and peace preserved.

ACT OF RENUNCIATION OF THE DUKE OF
AUGUSTENBURG,

SIGNED AT FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAINE, DECEMBER 30TH, 1852.

“§ 2. We hereby bind ourselves for our own person and family to take up our abode in future beyond the dominions and possessions of his Majesty, in which country we and our issue are neither permitted, nor desirous, to acquire any landed property.”

“§ 3. We hereby engage our princely word and honour to do nothing which might interfere with the tranquillity of your Majesty's dominions and countries, or which might endanger them. Likewise in noways willingly to counteract any arrangement your Majesty may be pleased to make for the succession in the dominions subject to your sceptre, or the eventual organization of your monarchy, in reference to which measures have been taken, or may be taken.”

“§ 4. Whatever rights and titles belonging to us and our descendants pertaining to the Ducal possessions and station of Augustenburg, we hereby resign.”

“§ 10. We hereby promise for ourselves and our heirs and descendants, that we on our part bind ourselves faithfully to accomplish what has been settled in the above document, and that we never will permit that any of ours shall in any way act in a contrary sense. This act we have signed in our own handwriting, and sealed with our own seal.”

PROTEST
OF THE
PRINCE OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOER.

(To the President of the Danish Diet.)

United Service Club, London,
March 24, 1853.

SIR,

I BEG, through you, to lay before the Diet the subjoined statement.

I have perused in the "Altona Mercury" of the 10th of March, a document purporting to be an engagement between the King of Denmark on the one side, and my brother, the Duke of Schleswig Holstein Augustenburg, on the other; in which the latter, in consideration of a sum of money, surrenders, in his own name and in that of his "family," all rights and claims which may interfere with any disposition which the King of Denmark may make in reference to the Succession.

Apprehending lest by the use of the unwonted word "family," that it may be supposed that I am an included, or consenting, party to any such arrangements, I here make the formal declaration, that I had no knowledge of them until I perused them in the papers, and that I conceive myself to be bound now by every lawful means to preserve rights which are not mere distinctions of a family, but which have arisen out of public necessities and for public use; and of which the wisdom and the value have never been more signally exhibited than on the present occasion, when on their maintenance depends the maintenance of the independence of a crown and the existence of a people.

Mutual confidence and respect for the historic institu-

tions and laws of the different portions of the Danish monarchy, was the bond by which that kingdom was held together; so soon as the idea arose of abolishing them confidence was destroyed and strength faded away. The part I took in the movement of 1848, was to support those ancient laws; when the representatives of the people innovated, and thereby attacked those institutions, I withdrew and so soon as a hostile spirit sprung up between the King and the people, I quitted the country. While resolved to defend the monarchical prerogative, I am equally so to maintain historical popular rights; and never will I submit to any arrangement by which the latter should be sacrificed.

The Treaty of the 8th of May, against which I have lodged this day my protest with the English Government I hold to be one of coercion and spoliation; nevertheless, there is one condition, to obtain which I would make every sacrifice. It is, that an arrangement shall be come to similar to that which was made in respect to the crowns of Spain and France at the Treaty of Utrecht, so that the crowns of Denmark and of Russia shall never be united on the same head; and Denmark and the Duchies be thereby incorporated in the Russian Empire.


I have the honour to remain, &c.


(Signed) F. OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOER.



DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

SECOND EDITION.





DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

THE SOUND AND THE BOSPHORUS.*

THERE are in Europe so many means of disguise and concealment that the acting hand is never seen and rarely suspected, but the east affords the key to the north and west. Thus the affair of the Danish Duchies, which is taken in Europe for a real quarrel, affecting other countries only by the anxieties and embarrassments it caused them, is to those conversant with the events of the east, a mere contrivance of which both parties are the victims, and having nothing real, save the faculty possessed by a barbarous power, to use the statesmen and the nations, the measures of the one and the passions of the other, for her own ends.

A similar transaction has been simultaneously in progress in the south; the two may be advantageously brought together as mutually elucidating each other.

“It was quite enough in delivering Finland to the Russians to have afforded them the means of a step in advance towards the Sound, as a point from which they will not be less menacing at a

* Written at Constantinople in January 1851.

“future day, when, the Russian Colossus with one
“foot on the Dardanelles and another on the Sound,
“will make the whole world his slave, and liberty
“will have fled to America. However chimerical
“all this may seem now to narrow minds, it will
“one day be a cruel reality: for Europe, unwisely
“divided like the towns of Greece in presence of
“the Kings of Macedonia, will have probably the
“same lot.”

The recorder of these ominous words (M. Thiers) may have reconciled himself to this fate, which he has contributed no less to accomplish than foretell; but the prophecy is not therefore the less impressive. To the pursuit of the means which shall bring its accomplishment, Russia is not less instigated by necessity than ambition, these channels are not portals only, but nooses; they are the keys of the house of the Czars, until they are possessed, the internal condition of Russia is exposed to the greatest hazard, and the prosperity of her provinces and the tranquillity of her state, are at the mercy of an order emanating from a Port-captain at Constantinople, or a Commandant at Elsineur. Strange exhibition of the triumph of mind over matter, that the possession of a strait which closes a vast expanse of sea, receiving the drainage and produce of extensive regions, and at pleasure closing against them the commerce of the world—instead of conferring strength and wealth on the possessor, should expose him to daily dread, to periodical convulsion, and to ultimate subjection! Strange that to be held by the throat should render a state mistress of

the spirit, faculties, or fate of those who so hold it ! If there be a political proposition self-evident it is the relationship of the Baltic and the Black Sea, and thereby of Denmark and Turkey,* of the Sound and the Bosphorus, of the Duchies and the Principalities ; and if it be undoubted that Russia does employ her power, physical and mental, to the acquisition of the latter, it follows that she is no less entirely engaged with the same purpose in the former.

Adjoining each Strait, there are two Provinces linked together, yet distinct ; in race and institutions separated from the Governments to which they belong ; having Constitutions established by Treaty and practice through a long course of time. This is what has in each afforded the opportunity to sow dissensions, and to establish a schism with the metropolis. The Porte has been for generations quarrelling with her Principalities, it is notorious that this is Russia's work : Denmark is now quarrelling with her Duchies—I propose to show that she has also done it.

The dates no less than the processes coincide. Peter bargained with Prince Cantemir for the occupation of Moldavia : he disposed of a daughter to secure the succession of Holstein. The circumstances in some respects differ. The Principalities adjoined her frontier—the Duchies were remote ; it was only by passing over the one that Eastern con-

* Russia is the eventual heir of Denmark, and is alleged to be about to succeed to an inheritance in Turkey.

“ Shall we go to war with Russia to prevent her from inheriting Constantinople ? ” — *Lamartine*.

quest could be achieved ;—it was only by disguising her purpose as regards the other, that Western susceptibilities could be allayed : hence the difference, there maskless violence—here, careful management ; in the one case armies, in the other, diplomacy : on the Black sea Occupation—Mediation on the Baltic.

But for either, internal dissensions were requisite, and for dissensions, grievances : whatever difficulty there might be in leading a Government like that of Copenhagen into such a course against dependencies of so great relative strength, there was none, in regard to the Principalities ; between misrule, negligence and ferocity, the Porte seemed to have no care on her mind, or no task on her hand but to accomplish or anticipate the wishes of her rival ; consequently we have seen Russia with periodical regularity marching into these Dependencies without contention or resistance. It has so happened, however, that she had with equal regularity to walk back again. It might be that the people, however disgusted with the Turks had still some disgust in reserve for the Kalmucks, and that at all events they preferred to liberating armies they had to feed, tyrants they never saw. In fact, the ill will of the people against the Turks was exaggerated. They could not misrule much, where they did not rule at all ; nor be very ferocious when never present. Their haughty carelessness removed deep grounds of opposition, and their subjects could not suspect them of insidious designs, far less of theoretic views, against their independence. Their barbarism was sterling—a barbarism of gold, besides the

pinebeck civilization of the Russians; it was a barbarism ignorant and stupid; it inflicted neither conscription nor serfage; warred with no peculiarity of tongue, opinion, or habit; and did not bless the nations with uniformity or centralization. Now, Russia's business was to teach the Porte this barbarism, and to quicken it into civilization; for the day that the Turks proposed to themselves to *unite the Principalities*, she became mistress on the Danube. Nay, her sway would extend if her flag was not there unfurled, to the heights of the Bosphorus and the fortresses of the Dardanelles. The Turks, though not ripe for so finished a scholarship, did make advances towards it: nad Russia succeeded almost invariably in having administrative transformed into diplomatic questions, as elsewhere she transforms diplomatic into administrative ones. Thus the decision of all cases was transferred from Bucharest or Jassy to Constantinople, there to be managed by Dragomans, and finally to be settled by a **FIRMAN**: that is, by an imperial and arbitrary decree, such as the *Ordonnances* by which Algeria is ruled. Governing by Firman was, in fact, an "administrative union;" for it was a violation of the guaranteed privileges of the Principalities, subjecting them to the general administration of the empire, without the conditions or guarantees on which that administration rests. It had all the additional disadvantage of being provisional and incoherent. However, the people in that incoherence found at least food for future hope, and whatever the misery of their condition they referred

it not to the Turks, whom they knew to be stupid, but to the Russians, whom they believed to be artful. The Principalities often irritated, were never alienated, and the periodical successes of Russian craft, as regularly prepared for the returning preponderance of Turkish apathy.

At this moment in presence of a Russian army of occupation, so complete has been the ascendancy gained by the Porte, that while in one of the provincial capitals the Turkish Commissioner was received with every demonstration of enthusiasm by that class which Russia has, so to say, created, no one would visit or receive visits from the Russian Commander-in-Chief; yet the one is a distinguished general and writer, the other a young untried man, recently filling no higher post than that of a subordinate clerkship.

Were the dispositions of the Wallachians the other way, the empire would not hold together for six months, or would be handed over to the Czar in order to preserve its "integrity and independence." I may refer to what has recently passed before our eyes. There was a conspiracy organized throughout the empire, from north to south, and from east to west, the basis of which was the army of occupation in the Principalities. A revolution there was to justify its reinforcement by 50,000 men collected in Bessarabia; commotions prepared to the south, and a disputed succession, on the removal of the Sultan, would have enabled this body to advance on Adrianople, whilst the squadron from Sevastapol dropped down the Bosphorus to

protect the empire and fix the election of the new Sultan. Such was the plan, as credited by persons who had opportunities of knowledge; and it is difficult without some such purpose and agency, to account for the extraordinary circumstances which did occur, and which occurred simultaneously.

There can be no question that an extensive insurrection was concerted throughout Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Servia, though it was rendered abortive by the prompt measures of the Servian Government, which was represented up to the moment of the explosion as its source. There can be no doubt that, at that precise moment, a revolution was on the point of breaking out at Bucharest, though it was stopped by the activity of Achmet Effendi, and the influence which he had acquired. At the same moment the Admiral's ship is blown up in the Golden Horn, when the ministers might have been on board: the fact is explained,—but not denied: nor is it asserted, that it is a common thing for flag-ships to blow up. The sudden dismissal of the Sultan's Austrian physician (Dr. Spitzer)* is also explained; but still that also occurs at the same moment: and it also happens that a German newspaper reaches Constantinople accounting for this sudden removal, by a eunuch's having fallen a victim to a potion destined by him for the Sultan, and actually delivered into his own hands, when the same story was only beginning to ooze out through the entourage of the seraglio; a story believed because not contradicted by men in high office. His death would not, like that

* See note at the end of the Chapter.

of his father, have been followed simply by the investiture of his successor, but by a contested succession between his brother and his sons. At this time also took place the massacre and insurrection of Aleppo, although the accidental presence of General Bem arrested the incalculable disasters it might have entailed. This affair, the furthest removed, from the Principalities in point of distance touches them nearest in its effects, and requires a word of explanation.

A certain Armenian, named Yazmadji, implicated in the attempt to assassinate Kossuth *—publicly known here to be a secret agent of Austria, and as generally reputed to be a poisoner, arrived at Aleppo shortly before the disturbance, accompanied by eight Hungarian renegades, who were paraded about the public places in Mussulman costume. In a few days they abjured Mahomedanism, and reviled the faith, which is known to be the deadliest offence to Mahomedans, and then took refuge at the different consulates. Other exasperating circumstances were not wanting, but this was the immediate cause of that sanguinary and alarming insurrection. It has been indeed attributed to a reaction of barbarian fanaticism against the new order of things,—but Europeans were not maltreated after Navarino: if it had been mere blind fanaticism, or Mussulman haughtiness, how should the Armenian, and the Jew, have been spared, when

* A case into which the English Embassy instituted an inquiry, and concluded for the reality of the charge; at least it allowed that belief to be entertained at Pera.

the Frank, the Catholic, and the Greek, were pursued with rancour and brutality ?

After the rage of the people had been exerted against the Franks and the Consuls, the Arabs of the Desert, with admirable instinct, arrived. No Yazmadji had been amongst them, but they had gone down to Egypt, and each man had returned, with gold in his sack, some ten, some twenty, some thirty thousand dollars.

The connection of Abbas Pasha might not have been so clear as that of the Austrian agent with the Czar, but the veil was raised. Within the shortest time that intelligence of the events of Aleppo could reach St. Petersburg, a leader appeared in the "Northern Bee," the effect of which on the society of that capital was not less great than if the Emperor had gone in person to pay a visit to a sub-lieutenant of dragoons. Nothing appears in any Russian journal save what is ordered by the Government, but this journal is specially the organ of the Emperor. There Abbas Pasha was vindicated against charges of treason—whilst at Constantinople everything was explained by the repugnance of the Arabs to the conscription !

The alertness of the Editor of the "Northern Bee" was not a solitary incident: the signal was watched for in London with as much eagerness as at St. Petersburg. The instant that the achievement of Yazmadji is known, the English Minister writes to Paris to suggest the necessity of measures against the Ottoman Empire; and the French Government, which sees its safety only in the Cos-

sacks, was nothing loathe to render the service to its protector, of recommending a new phasis of diplomatic action, in its modern acceptance of fleets and broadsides. The English Ambassador at Paris hastens to the Foreign Office, General La Hitte listens with profound attention. The Representative of Russia happens to call at the same moment, and is waiting in an adjoining room. The Protocol is in the very act of parturition, when the door opens and a *chef de bureau* enters and places in the hands of the General-Minister the official report of General Bem, which had reached Paris in an unofficial manner.*

By this document the total loss of life at Aleppo was reduced to fifteen, and the explosion of fanaticism was explained as arising from obscure and foreign intriguers; the measures adopted by the Government were stated to have arrested the disorders, and its intention was declared to punish the delinquents. So fell, still-born, the Protocol, and the Representatives of England and Russia had to return to their respective hotel *re infectâ*. The French Government, which is sometimes given to oscillations, having desisted from smiting the Porte by a "coalition," raised it to the skies in an article in "La Patrie;" and the Government, against whom in the morning was to be evoked a crusade of revolution and Christianity was, in the evening, held up to the theatres and

* This statement was that circulated in high quarters at the time in Constantinople; I have no means of testing its accuracy; but it partly rested on a report of Callimachi.

clubs of Paris as a model of firmness and moderation, and pointed out as a hopeful prop to that civilization which was appearing to run many hazardous chances in the West. The *Chef de Bureau*, however, not being sufficiently Russian for the Foreign Department, was transferred to another ; and Bem, who had killed both insurrection and Protocol, was despatched to the other world.*

What consequences may not be anticipated from the presence of a hostile army in the midst of an empire ? The wonder is not that such schemes should be carried on, but that they have not long ago proved successful.

But what brought these armies there—was it conquest ? No—Revolution ! At Jassy and Bucharest, Russia, who had no ostensible connection with the incitation of those of Paris, Vienna, Berlin, &c., directly moved. The Princes, the Friends of the Porte, the Liberals, and the Russian Partizans, all conspired as it were together, against one another ; the impulse once given, the revolution directed itself with fury against her, and that was the pretext she awaited to bring in her troops ; and so she gained her entrance into Hungary.

* The English Ambassador at Constantinople interposed to prevent the Porte from conferring any mark of favour on General Bem. Into the circumstances of his death an enquiry was instituted by confidential agents, who reported that the treatment of his malady (intermittent fever) had been such as to insure a fatal issue. His medical attendant, as well as his Aides-de-Camp, had been recommended by a Hungarian General of Jewish origin, (General Stein), now known to have been throughout a traitor. These persons had apostatised ; on the death of Bem they fled.

We will now see how revolutions served her at Copenhagen.

This pamphlet reached Vienna at the end of June 1852; and on the 28th of August there appeared in the Angsburg Gazette the following communication, in the shape of a letter dated "Constantinople August 14th."

"We cannot make ourselves responsible for either the whole or the separate parts of what we are going to relate. A conspiracy has been discovered for removing by violence the present Sultan, and placing his brother on the throne, the object being to root out all Frankish novelties. The reactionary Party, crushed by Mahomed, seems to have gained new strength and courage, since the triumph of reactionary principles throughout Europe.

"The Sultan's physician, Dr. Spitzer has been suddenly removed, and appointed Councillor of the Turkish Legation at Vienna. There are many stories afloat, the most probable one is that Dr. Spitzer was offered an enormous sum by the reactionary party if he would poison the Sultan, and threatened with a speedy death if he refused. The Doctor showed the letter to the Sultan, and has been removed to save him from danger. Last time it was the Sultan's brother, whom it was attempted to gain over, but who made the Sultan aware of what was going on The journey of the Sultan to Chalki, to visit the new Marine School, was to be taken advantage of to carry out the views of the conspirators, when the Sultana Valide sent a steamer after the Sultan, to make known the conspiracy to him. Many persons have been arrested, and various Pashas have disappeared. People too have recollected that on that very day two years, when the Sultan was to have gone on board the Admiral's ship blew up."

The mystification here attempted will deceive no one. I had afforded to Dr. Spitzer the opportunity, if innocent, of clearing himself. I brought it forward, indeed, merely as the current rumour at Constantinople. Now it appears likely to stand as a matter of history.

THE SCHISM OF DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

THE AGNATIC AND COGNATIC LINES.

THE Duchies were heard of for the first time at the same period ; but the schism preceded the events of Europe, and has extended beyond their term. Elsewhere conflagrations have burst forth, and then subsided, country by country : a few months of agony, or at best an army of invasion, and all was over ; but this pitiable Denmark, and these miserable Duchies return again and again upon the surface like the bubbling of a quagmire. A matter which might have been settled in five minutes, and States which could have been devastated from end to end in a week, have kept Europe in suspense, Exchange, in agitation, Commerce in alarm during three years, in which it might have been supposed that colossal events and frightful catastrophes had exhausted the susceptibility of men.

A member of the old Dynasty of Oldenburgh sits on the throne of Russia, and she of all the powers of Europe alone holds back ! The Government which has pursued this course of undisguised violence, as regards those remote dependencies of the Porte, is wholly careless of her own political and dynastic interests in a European kingdom of

such close neighbourhood and such vast importance! But has she not renounced her rights, and having given this proof of disinterestedness, is not her abstinence a delicacy which deserves respect? Let us see.

Charles Frederick, representative of the junior or Gottorp line, having during the Swedish war, lost Schleswig, and retaining only a portion of Holstein, but being according to the peculiar and anomalous practice of these Duchies co-regent with the king, sought in 1720 the support of Peter I. of Russia, who was not backward in securing the opening thus afforded into Germany, although unable at the moment to profit by it. He conferred on Duke Charles the hand of his eldest daughter Anna, and confided the issue to time and industry. Russia's maritime power was then no match for that of Denmark, and it appeared that difficulties was the only inheritance the alliance would bring to the Imperial House. However, the concession was small, of a daughter doubly illegitimate;* and this was the first alliance of the Czars with a Princely House. On his death and the accession of his widow, Catherine I., the matter of the Duchy was about to be raised, when she too was removed from the troubles of this earth. The King of Denmark now negotiated with the Emperor as head of the German Empire, of which Holstein was a fief, and a treaty

* The husband of Catherine and the wife of Peter, Eudocia Lapoukin, were both alive when she was born; and therefore she and her son and her sister Elizabeth, were not so much as mentioned on the accession of Anne.

was signed between them, by which the claims of the Duke of Holstein on the Duchies were set aside, and compensation of 1,000,000 crowns allowed (if claimed within a certain time). To this treaty* the Empress Anne of Russia acceded. Nevertheless, the Duke rejected with scorn the indemnity, and indignantly protested against this attempted interference with his rights. His son, afterwards raised to the Imperial Throne on renouncing Protestantism, under the name of Peter III., in like manner rejected the offered compensation, and refused to admit the validity of the treaty. So soon as this unhappy Prince obtained possession of the sceptre, he prepared to recover his paternal inheritance. His suspected Lutheranism, his paraded Germanism, had already rendered him obnoxious; however, he recovered suddenly by the first acts of his government the heart of the Russians, when these measures against Denmark afforded to his wife (afterwards Catherine II.) the means of casting him from a throne to a dungeon and tomb.†

That revolution which changed the face of Europe was thus owing to the Duchies. The Danish minister and party (for Denmark then had a party at

* The prototype and antitype of the Treaty of the 8th May, 1852.

† In a despatch (not published) from Mr. Keith to Lord Granville, July 12, 1762, giving an account of the dethronement of Peter III., it is stated that "the discontent among the guards was heightened by the resolution his Imperial Majesty had taken of carrying a great part of that corps into Germany, in his expedition against Denmark, which was a measure disagreeable to the whole nation, who stomached greatly their being drawn into new

St. Petersburg) lent, in common with those of Vienna and Versailles, their aid to Catherine, and were initiated into the conspiracy ; and on the moment of its triumph she conveyed to the Danish minister the assurance that he need be under no apprehension as to the Duchies ; but she carefully avoided concluding any thing, and sent her husband's uncle, Prince George of Holstein, as Governor of Kiel. "Though she employed neither fleets nor armies, she kept that court floating between the hope of obtaining the entire session of Schleswig and the fear of seeing itself dispossessed of that important province ;"* and so domineered as imperiously at Copenhagen as at Warsaw, for it was enough for the Russian minister to whisper the word "Holstein," to solve every difficulty, and to cause every obstacle to bend to his will.

This course had also its inconveniences and its limits. The other powers were seriously indisposed, and at times resentful. The incorporation of either Duchy was impracticable without war, and objectless in itself, and more was to be made by cession than even successful hostilities. So in 1767 Catherine bargained for a conditional surrender of her son's rights, which was ratified by her son, afterwards the Emperor Paul, in 1773,—eleven years after her accession and pledge. Great were the rejoicings at Copenhagen : the event was celebrated by fes-

expenses and new dangers for recovering the Duchy of Sleswick, which they considered as a trifling object, and entirely indifferent to Russia."

* Castéra, vol. 2, p. 239.

tivities and commemorated by a medal : the victory was attributed to the talents of Bernsdorff, but the honour was shared with the gold he had lavished at St. Petersburg. It soon, however, appeared that a price had been paid in another coin, that of a *secret alliance* : in consequence of which Denmark afterwards found herself compromised with Sweden, England, and Prussia ; and out of this combination Catherine was enabled to concert the coalition of the North against England, known as “ the Armed Neutrality.”*

But after all, to what did this settlement amount ? It consists in two acts : the one a *renunciation*, the other a *cession*. The renunciation regards Schleswig ; the cession, Holstein. The first is in favour of the King of Denmark, *his heirs* and *successors* generally ; the second is to his *male* descendants.

But an equivalent was received ; namely, the counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, which the King of Denmark ceded under the conditions as regards succession, on which he held them himself. He surrendered all he could surrender, the possession by himself and his male line, after which they reverted to the line at present represented by the Duke of Augustenburg. “ Gunther, the last “ Count of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, died in “ 1667. The Duke Joachim Ernest of Plöen was “ the oldest member of the Oldenburg dynasty, entitled to succeed him. But the King of Denmark

* Which she was pleased to designate to Lord Malmesbury as “ the Armed Nullity.”

“ and the Duke of Gottorp opposed the succession;
“ and took possession of the counties. A complaint
“ was made before the tribunal of the Empire by the
“ Duke of Gottorp, and by his sons after him, and favourable judgment was obtained. The King, without taking part in the process, commenced a negotiation with the Dukes of Plöen, and came to terms with them. He paid them a handsome sum and several domains in Holstein, and they in their turn ceded the two counties to him and to the male line of his House, but providing, if the male line of the Royal House should become extinct, that the succession to the two counties should return to them and their male descendants, and likewise to the agnates of their princely house.”*

Paul, therefore, limited, in like manner, the tenure of the equivalent he gave in Holstein; and, as on the extinction of the male descendants of the Royal line, the ceded counties would revert from Russia to the agnates, so the ceded property of Holstein would revert to Russia.

As to Schleswig, the position was different. The father of Peter had, on account of his dispossession and the events of war, been constrained to drop the title of Schleswig, and to restrict it to that of “Gottorp-Holstein.” In the contest between Sweden and Denmark, England and France had interposed, and had bound themselves to *guarantee* to the King of Denmark the possession of Schleswig against “any foreign power whatsoever who should come and attack it.” The claim of Paul was here of so

* Gruner, p. 109.

uncertain a character, and the combination of foreign powers so formidable against his pretensions, that it was necessary to surrender them before any negotiation could take place. No equivalent could have been demanded, none was demanded, and the cession was made absolutely.

Now though this distinction is thus accounted for by the circumstances of the times and case, it is not the less true that it presented to the Russian Government great contingent advantages, by which, the course it has adopted shows, that it intends to profit.

On the death of Frederick VII. and his uncle, her claims indeed, on one point only, revive ; but to be able to raise one point suffices ; until that period arrives her absolute renunciation on the other is accepted as general and conclusive. She gets credit for disinterestedness and magnanimity, remains an indifferent spectator, and may be appealed to as an impartial arbiter. She has sedulously held back on every occasion, and has found means to prevent any appeal from being made to her (at least, so as to become public) by those Governments who, in dealing with the subject, were bound first to ascertain her views. She has suffered foreign powers to invade with arms, and interpose by mediation in territories, and in respect to rights, where she was immediately and primarily concerned ; conduct incompatible with the idea of the possession of rights.

On any new settlement she can interpose in every point, and alone of the powers of Europe has a right to interpose in any. By reviving her claims on

Holstein, she breaks up the integrity of the succession, and has it at her option to preserve it by a new renunciation. She can displace the Dukes of Oldenburg, or suffer them to continue to exist. She can again, in the event of a separation between the Kingdom and the Duchies, share with the Augustenburgs, or purchase them by a concession which costs her nothing. She has it in her option, if she is so minded, to reanimate popular claims, and to defer to the Diets. Over each body and each individual she possesses an entire control, being able to fill them with hopes and fears. A prudent reserve has secured this wide field for her activity, and this magnificent harvest for her ambition.

On the failure of the male line, Denmark was to go to Prince Frederick of Hesse, and the Duchies to the Duke of Augustenburg. This was the source of the perturbation of the Danish Court, and of the whole Monarchy. When then the Emperor of Russia took Prince Frederick so entirely under his protection as to give him, nay, to force on him, one of his daughters in marriage, the Court of Copenhagen was scarcely less rejoiced than in 1773; and although on the condition of accepting an undisguised Russian Protectorate, they exulted in an alliance which secured the integrity of the kingdom. Russia would now resign her own claims on Holstein (of which the Court of Copenhagen at least was fully aware) and exert her influence to shut out the Augustenburgs from the succession of the Duchies. The Archduchess died, and that combination was frustrated; but if

the Czar did lose a daughter, he did not lose Denmark.*

At this time a remarkable diplomatic incident occurred. A person of no less note than the Duke De Cases was sent by Louis Philippe to Copenhagen on an extraordinary mission, the object of which was kept a profound secret. That it was successful and eminently satisfactory to the Danish King there could be no doubt: the Grand Cross of the order of the Elephant, an order then restricted to twelve persons, having been conferred on the Duke, whilst an Envoy Extraordinary, Count Daneskiold, being sent to Paris in response to the French mission to Copenhagen. Immediately followed the letters patent of the 8th of July, 1846, which attempted by an act of authority, to impose one and the same succession on the Duchies and the Kingdom.

The contents of a letter from the King of Denmark, dated a few days before this ordinance, and which has come to the knowledge of the writer, conveys to Louis Philippe thanks for his wise counsels, given in the "interest of the integrity and conservation" of Denmark.† The fruit of

* "Poor Emperor! he has lost by one blow a daughter and a kingdom."—*General Skrznecki*.

† At that moment the Spanish marriages were in preparation, and Louis Philippe was accused of seeking to gain Russia, to secure himself against the effects of his rupture with England. The *Times* said he was ready, in return for some show of countenance from a Russian ambassador, "to sacrifice everything from Cracow to Constantinople;" and the *Morning Chronicle*, the official organ, pointed to the scaffold as the consequence of his betrayal of the interests of France and Europe.

these "wise counsels" the world has since beheld at Paris as well as Copenhagen.

Let us consider whether there were not legal and constitutional, or at least practicable means of adjustment. Let us see whether the divergency of succession was unavoidable, and beyond the control of existing authorities and living men.

As to Denmark, the *Lex Regia* is taken as an immutable decree, and the succession under it as irrevocable. This fact can scarcely be explained save on the supposition that no one has read the document.

The Danish Crown was originally elective. Christian I. was elected; his second son, Frederick I., from whom have sprung the Royal and Ducal branches, was elected; and the Diets claiming the authority to withdraw the power which they conceded, displaced his nephew, to make way for the second founder of the Family, Frederick III., who enacted the *Lex Regia*: he himself had been elected.

In his reign a remarkable revolution took place against the aristocratic power, and the people and clergy selecting the Crown as their representative, vested in it the most uncontrolled authority to which expression has ever been given in a public Act, declaring it "independent upon earth," and acknowledging "no higher power than God alone." To effect their purpose, it became requisite to alter the succession, as an Elective Monarchy was of necessity a manorial one: and the power of the Diets was triply barred by rendering the Crown absolute, here-

ditary, and extending the succession to females—such, at least, appears to be the reason of this change. Henceforward each Sovereign of Denmark in succession (having attained his or her 14th year) was in his own person possessed of the right of laying taxes upon the inhabitants, of absolute authority in the affairs of the Church, and empowered “to make, alter, and repeal all laws, and to dispense with them as he shall think proper.”

Under this commission Frederick III. established an order of succession in the *Lex Regia*, in accordance, no doubt, with the then disposition of the nation, for the reasons above assigned, but still without any intervention on the part of the nation, and solely by the plenitude of his own despotic power. This succession he declares absolute and final, enacting that the descent shall so continue “to a thousand generations.”

Looking merely to the terms of the Law, and transferring to it the Constitutional Character of the Authority under which it was issued, modern disputants have agreed to accept it as final. What has been already said will show that it possessed no such character. Frederick III. was not empowered to limit the authority of his successors as to “making, altering, repealing, or dispensing” with existing laws, of ancient or of modern date. The authority he used he did transmit, and each and all of his successors could dispense with the *Lex Regia* by the same power by which he had enacted it.

Were it not so, the Law itself has been virtually repealed by being broken in two points, and these

its principal provisions. It settles conjointly the succession of Denmark and Norway, expressly stating, in section 19, that both kingdoms "shall remain undivided in the possession of one absolute and hereditary King of *Denmark and Norway*." In section 26 it is enacted that the Kings of Denmark and Norway enjoy "uncircumscribed and unlimited power and authority in the strongest sense that any other Christian hereditary and despotic King can be said to enjoy the same, * * * * and for the further strengthening of the same, we WILL and COMMAND that whosoever presumes to speak or act any thing which may be prejudicial to our absolute power and authority, be proceeded against as a traitor to our Crown and dignity, and be severely punished, as usual in cases of High Treason."

Thus then the *Lex Regia* has been extinguished by the Congress of Vienna, and there no longer exists the Potentate from whom it emanated, viz. a King of *Denmark and Norway*. If it did remain in force Christian VIII. would have been, and Frederick VII. would be, together with the ministers of both, liable to the pains and penalties of high treason; having plotted to subvert "that absolute sovereignty," by the introduction of a constitutional form of government.

It is to be remarked that the hereditary and the absolute character and quality of the Monarchy were essentially combined, that the hereditary was auxiliary to the absolute, that the absolute was the aim and purpose of the state reasons of that time: whence it is to be inferred that the absolute charac-

ter cannot be attacked without destroying the hereditary, either in regard to the legal or the political view of the case. The object of the revolution of 1660, was the establishment of despotic power: the introduction of a constitution vitiates the proceeding, and nullifies all its consequences. The very grounds upon which the new measures rest, imply an authority in the king to dispense with the laws of 1660, or in the nation to supersede its then revolution. In either case the *Lex Regia* falls; and it remains—to revert to the anterior state, or to create a new one. In the one case the Crown of Denmark again becomes elective, in the other, you must deal with the succession of the crown as you have with the institutions of the country. These constructive alternatives are practically reduced to one and the same solution, and the succession is resubmitted for decision to the nation.

It is impossible to imagine, taking it upon the points of law, treating it on considerations of an historic kind, viewing it as a matter of national policy, or submitting it to the mere rule of common sense, a case more clear. It is not the arguments, it is the proofs that are cumulative: it is the marrow and the root of the whole matter in debate. There is not a single argument urged on the other side; the point has not been so much as raised;* the object was to keep it out of view. We have heard of unrighteous judges, of false testimony, and

* "There can be no question as to the succession of Denmark Proper."—*Gruner*.

packed juries : but in this cause, judge, jury, testimony, advocates and parties have from beginning to end been suborned, brow-beaten, falsified, and packed. Prince Frederick of Hesse, has therefore no legal claim to Denmark, and it is the assumption of his indefeasible right which threatens the disruption of the Monarchy.

The founder of the Oldenburg line in the Duchies was the same Christian I. who we have seen was called to fill the throne of Denmark. The Estates of the Duchies, in electing him in ~~1640~~ ¹⁴⁶⁰ as their Duke, expressly stated that he was selected not because he was already King of Denmark, but because he promised to maintain the indissoluble connection of Holstein and Schleswig. There was, moreover, an agreement between the parties to select the Duke in future amongst his male descendants. Up to the middle of the 17th century the right of election remained intact, when the order of succession according to primogeniture was introduced, and Frederic III. in 1650, with the sanction of the Diet, promulgated a law confining the succession to the male line in the order of primogeniture, stating explicitly that "this is to be an Everlasting Law of our Royal line of the Princely House of Schleswig-Holstein." This is the only law promulgated in the Duchies. In 1709, the House of Saxony, then reigning in Poland, advanced claims of succession not only in Denmark but in the Duchies, on the ground of descent from the female branch of the reigning House of Denmark. Frederic IV. protested against such claims on the Duchies, emphati-

cally declaring that "the female succession in Denmark has its roots in the *Lex Regia*, and does not extend to the Duchies." It is clear that any change in the order of succession in the Duchies could only be effected by the constitutional sanction of the Diet, or by an act of violence on the part of the Crown, which, however, to have legal value, must have received the sanction of the same authority.

An act of violence the Danes assert did take place in 1721. As this is the whole of their case in regard to the Duchy of Schleswig, it is necessary to examine into that transaction. Frederic IV. (the monarch, be it observed, who in 1709 we found vindicating so conclusively the rights of the Duchies against all pretenders) feeling the inconvenience resulting from divided sovereignty in the Duchies, seized on the portion of Schleswig possessed by the Gottorp branch, and declared his intentions by letters patent (22nd August, 1721) to incorporate *that portion* of the Duchy with his own. He exacted an oath of homage from the Nobles, Prelates, and other Proprietors of the Ducal portion, in which they recognised his right to reunite to the Royal the Ducal portion, and to incorporate the same anew and for ever after with the Crown, having been in olden time severed from said Crown "*injuria temporum*," and in which they swore fidelity to him, his heirs and successors, "*secundum tenorem legis Regiæ*."

In this the Danish writers affect to see the resumption by the Crown of a fief a long time alienated,

viz. the whole of Schleswig, and the recognition of the act by the arrière-vassals. But the letters-patent point to the Gottorp portion only as having been "in time of Difficulty and misfortune unjustly severed from the Crown of Denmark," and the oath was not required from the holders of land in the Royal portion. The effect, therefore, if not the intention, was limited to the fractions of the Duchy, and did not effect it as an integer. It is, however, contended that thereby was introduced into the whole Duchy, and indeed into both Duchies, the order of succession established in Denmark, because the Proprietors had sworn allegiance to the heir and his successors according to the Royal Law. But the individual act of the Proprietors in a fractional portion of the Duchy could not dispose of the rights of the entire Duchy, or reduce it to the condition of a Danish province.

If the oath meant anything more than a recognition on the part of the arrière-vassals of a *sole* Duke, it became divested of all value whatever.

1460 On the other hand, the King succeeding by virtue of the law of ~~1650~~, he could not change the order of succession therein laid down; such a change required the intervention of the Estates formally convened in Diet.

As to the words "*secundum tenorem legis Regiæ*," there might be ambiguity if there had been but one law to which they could apply, and that law a Danish one: but the ambiguity disappears when there are two: both are *royal* laws. It is not therefore the Danish royal law of 1665 that is meant

—but that of the Duchies—the law of 1650. If there was an intentional suppression, the fact would only prove the strength of the objection, and if the term *Danica* had been introduced and adopted, which it was not, it would nevertheless be destitute of legal value.

The Danish writers seek to fortify their case by an incidental reference to conquest. But if conquest be used as an argument it must supersede all others; —if not, then it cannot be advanced. Conquest in itself changes nothing: the war abrogates anterior laws and treaties: the compacts which succeed conquest, establish the new rights, if there are any. Such a pretence is therefore wholly inadmissible, and were it entirely valid it would apply only to the Ducal portion of the Duchy; and again, if valid and applicable to the whole Duchy, the Danish Government has put itself out of court on this plea, by treating for a renunciation with Russia.

As regards Holstein, a German fief,* the Danish partizans object to the nonfulfilment by the Agnatic line of certain forms of investiture—neglect of which cannot now be remedied in consequence of there being no head to the Germanic Empire. Suffice it to say that a question of form is a preliminary objection, and it has fallen from the moment the discussion has been opened on the merits of the case.

Further, the argument holds good at least against the members of the Oldenburg family, that the

* By the Convention of Odease in 1579 the principles of German feudal law were introduced into Schleswig: the same arguments of informality may therefore be urged in regard to that Duchy.

two Duchies are indissolubly connected, such being the original stipulation on which the Duchies consented to accept that family in the person of its founder: nothing but the express sanction of the Diet can reverse this agreement.

So long therefore as the *Lex Regia* is admitted to have force, the succession in Denmark depends on the will of the reigning king; whilst as regards the Duchies he has no title whatever to interfere.

Now if Christian had determined to unite the monarchy in the person of Prince Frederick of Hesse, the course to pursue was to address himself to the Diets. He would thus have given to himself immense power over the deliberations of these bodies, and might have readily obtained of them the settlement he desired. He might have failed, but by the other course it was impossible to succeed—especially when the Prince of Hesse was presented under the sanction of a matrimonial alliance which evinced the purpose of over-riding the right and will of the Duchies by a foreign coalition. If he failed with the Duchies then he could fall back upon Denmark. If the Duchies would not accept Hesse, he could make Augustenburg acceptable to Denmark. He could do this alike by the virtue of his despotic power, not then abrogated, or through the Constitutional machinery, at that very time projected: and the hereditary Dukes of the Duchies would have become again kings of Denmark on the very grounds of the original Constitution of the Monarchy. What might have been then effected is not to be judged of by the feelings and

opinions which now prevail. Blood had **not** then been drawn—oppression had not been resisted—rebellion not punished—the King had yet power—the Government credit—the Duke of Augustenburg was not odious. These **are** the consequences of, not the reasons for, the **course** adopted.

One or other of these courses had of necessity to be taken to preserve the integrity of the monarchy. But the integrity of the monarchy was subordinated to the Prince of Hesse. No one has denied that the King of Denmark might have set aside the Danish succession in the *Lex Regia* and no one has denied or can deny that by adopting the Agnatic line he would have prevented the disruption of his estates. But no one inquires why a course so obvious and so easy has not been—is not adopted. Nor is it that the question is passed over in absolute silence. It is perceived and avoided, and if noticed, it is slurred over. In the most authoritative * document that has yet appeared, the question is placed and then disposed of by two contingent hypotheses; that the Prince of Hesse flattered the Dynastic propensities of the late King, and that the suppression of the ancient constitutional liberties of the Duchies

* "It is clear that the late King of Denmark might have easily prevented the disruption of his Estates, by establishing, in virtue of his absolute power, the male succession in Denmark. But whether an overthrow of the male succession in the Duchies flattered certain dynastic propensities and national vanity, or offered the additional attraction of the prospect of getting rid of ancient inconvenient constitutional liberties, this very simple means has not been adopted."—*Bunsen, Memoir to Lord Palmerston*, p. 25.

flattered the vanity of the Danish people. A manner so lax of dealing with a question so grave, in a document purporting to be a state paper, put forth in justification of an invasion, and in prospect of an European war arising out of the event, fills the mind with astonishment. Here is clearly a mystification.

It would be but natural for Christian or Frederick to seek to preserve the succession in his own family as against strangers, or in his own immediate line against remoter branches; and if dynastic propensities swayed him, the Duke of Augustenburg must be a stranger or a remoter branch than the Prince of Hesse. Will it be believed that he is the nearer of the two! Frederick of Hesse is nephew of Christian and first cousin of the present King: the Duke of Augustenburg was brother-in-law of the late King, is such to the present; the Duke's son stands in the same relationship to both Kings as the Prince of Hesse. Further, the Duke of Augustenburg is the eldest son of Louisa, only sister of Frederick VI., whose family were again intermarried with the present reigning branch.

As to the Constitutional rights of the Duchies, the argument required that they should be prostrated by the adoption of the Prince of Hesse; but those who put forward this hypothesis deny the very power. Is it not strange when both parties, nation and monarch, were bent on putting an end to absolutism in Denmark proper, that these constitutional liberties should not have been employed

for that end? As to Danish vanity, it was surely as easy to have enlisted it on the side of the integrity of the kingdom, as on that of the enforcement of the Danish tongue on the Schleswigers, at the risk of the disruption of the monarchy, with the certain loss of Holstein.

The only conclusion to be drawn is, that the case was intentionally embroiled; that every passion and every frailty of humanity, was called forth to obscure the judgment of the parties in a matter in which a Foreign Power had so great an interest at stake. It was, in fact, a contest between the Russian and Danish Cabinets, and no other result was to be anticipated, save that which we have seen, unless there had been parity of capacity in the conductors of the cause on both side. Denmark had no man equal to cope with the men that Russia had, and hence the inextricable confusion of the whole matter—a consequence which must appear under similar circumstances in every transaction, public or private.

So much for the Internal difficulties. We must now consider the claims of Foreign Powers—for the constitutional interposition of the Diets settled all hereditary claims resting on mere title of descent, as between all the branches springing from the ancient dynasty of Oldenburg, save in so far as those claims might be backed by force. The Russian line is alone in a position to thwart or oppose such a settlement. That she would be disposed to do so is unquestionable, as not only her special claims on parts of Holstein would be shut out, but

she would be shut out as heir-general. There may be, at present, no prospect of an extinction of the lines preceding the elder branch of Gottorp, but in no royal house have indigestions been so frequent and opportune as in that of Denmark,* and that prospect too remote to awaken the attention of Europe, may to her eyes present the attractions of a nearer fruition. The question then is, whether she could have thwarted or would have ventured to resist such a decision, for it would have had at once to be resisted. She could not have done so, as is shown by the care employed to lead the parties away from that easy accommodation. The King would have been able to direct against her the whole of that machinery, which he has allowed to be directed against himself; he would have been the preserver of the internal tranquillity of Schleswig; he would have been treated by the German confederation as the guardian of the rights of Holstein; he would have taken his stand on the fundamental compact of the indissoluble union to each other of the two Duchies; he would have been the protector of the integrity of the Monarchy, and that by implementing old contracts with the people, and rehabilitating their political rights, he would have had the guarantee of England and France in reality to appeal to, and if force had been employed against him, he would have been exposed to "attack" not to *insurrection*. In such pretensions put forward by Russia, Europe would indeed have seen cause

* Six known or suspected cases have occurred since that of the unhappy English Princess who sat on the Danish Throne.

of alarm, and the imprudence of such a step may be measured by the care she has taken to conceal the very fact of her possessing claims. But the supposition is ludicrous. Russia attacks no people that is united, and no Government that is able, and we are supposing the case—alas! vain supposition of a people, united by a plan of an able Government.

This is what the King might have done; what he did do, was precisely the reverse. He foreclosed the succession in Denmark, and attempted to force that of the Duchies. The letters patent, (July 8th, 1846) declare the common descent of the whole monarchy in the Cognatic line. Yet—"Respecting some parts of the Duchy, there are circumstances which oppose our asserting with equal certitude the title of all our lines to this Duchy." Thus was Christian well aware of the value of Russia's "cession," and if she was opposed, and of right (a right admitted by the reservation) this project for maintaining the integrity of the monarchy was a failure on its very face; nay, it frustrated itself. By the marriage with the Archduchess Russia having nailed Christian to the Prince of Hesse, drew off to play a separate part.

Against the letters patent the Duchies protested—Holstein appealed to the German Confederation. The King had to explain away the meaning of his letters patent, and to submit to a justificatory decree of the Confederation which bound him to the reversal of his act. On this the plan of Union came into operation, and he attempted to effect by an administrative amalgamation, that unity of suc-

cession which he had failed to bring about by an act of arbitrary power.

It is in the spirit of our times, not by ambition, but on principle, to concentrate power; customs, rights, are held to be only distinctions which separate men and impair the strengths of Governments. This is the blight on every political experiment; by it despotism reaps the victory, whenever the people wins the battle, and oppression is the result of every exercise of a nation's power. It does not therefore suggest of necessity any profound or malignant purpose to hear of a constitution proposed by the Danish or any other monarch for "the whole of his States;" yet a prince like Christian VIII. could not have fallen into such a scheme either through liberalism or inadvertence, which were neither to his nature, his antecedents, nor his circumstances. The disruption of the monarchy was before him; he was casting about for expedients to avert it; that monarchy was composed of two, if not equal at least balanced portions, and those portions were themselves but outlying fragments of two opposing systems, namely, the Scandinavian body on the one side, and the German on the other. The vulgar doctrines of centralization were here inapplicable, and he had before his eyes the experience of surrounding nations.

The last event which had disturbed the tranquillity and threatened the peace of Europe was an attempt to impose on a population of 300,000 souls, in the Pyrenees, the benefits of a liberal constitution; and although the Queen of Spain at the head of ninety-seven and a half per cent of the

Spanish people, against two and a half per cent, was backed by the active interference of England, France and Portugal, yet did she run a narrow risk of losing her crown, and after the expenditure of forty millions sterling, and the periodical devastation of Spain during six years, did these ancient liberties of that trifling population triumph in the convention of Bergara over the power and the wisdom of civilized and constitutional Europe.

Or going back to the last century, did not a similar cause bring on those disturbances of Europe which ended in the great revolution of France, and caused to England the loss of her magnificent transatlantic possessions? Was not this a result of her wishing to concentrate administrative power, and giving undue extension to representative authority?

A more recent and more apposite experience is presented by Russia herself, a fact which, though hidden from the eyes of Europe, could scarcely be unknown to Christian VIII. The Cossacks, little as it may be suspected abroad, are not a mere troop of irregular horse, but a constituted republic separated from Russia in a far more distinct manner than the Duchies are from Denmark: they admit no Russian to civil or military rank or post, and utterly repudiate the ecclesiastical pretensions and usurpations of the official Russian Church. An ukase was published assimilating their administration to that of the other provinces of the empire: their contingent had by precaution been already dispatched to distant frontiers; nevertheless the deputy Hetman instantly sent orders for the regiments of reserve to

rendezvous at the point of their territories nearest to Moscow. The Emperor did not accuse them of beginning the war, but with an army of 1,200,000 men at his disposal explained the ukase as a mistake.

It is possible to conceive that Russia should seek to get rid of a Constitution which interfered with her military system and religious unity—that the *doctrinaires* of Madrid should attempt to efface a contrast that put to shame their constitutional freedom when sustained only by a population insignificant in numbers—that England should have erred in estimating the strength and dispositions of a colonial population unarmed, unorganized, unrepresented, and only an outlying portion of her immense domains; but that Denmark should have out of her own head, devised an administrative union with the Duchies is too preposterous to believe. The Government of Copenhagen had neither project of conquests nor of religious concentration with which their rights or creed interfered; they were neither insignificant nor remote; there could be no mistake as to their disposition or their power to resist; they compose two-fifths of the population of the kingdom, and constitute one-half of its wealth; without them Denmark is nothing—less than nothing with them in arms against her. Denmark furnishes exclusively the maritime force of the kingdom, of little or no avail against the Duchies: and a contest would assuredly give to them powerful allies, and draw down on her the chances of a terrible retribution. Dismemberment was not then the limit of the consequences to be

apprehended from such a design, but was one so evident as not to escape the penetration even of a child.

Christian VIII. is gathered to his fathers, and Frederick VII. reigns in his stead. The dying King addresses a letter imploring him to walk in his footsteps; the successor with Oriental deference kisses the signature, and with filial piety obeys the command. Within three days the benevolent intentions of the new monarch are announced by a proclamation.

The Constitution was not, however, absolutely enacted. The King called on the different portions of the kingdom to elect in common with himself, men of trust, and experience of advise respecting it. He declared at the same time that the "existing laws and institutions of the provincial states" should be respected, and also "the existing union of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein." The Duchies were not seduced by the offer of equality, the temptation of controlling the Exchequer, or of seeing the Parliament held in their territory alternately with Copenhagen. They did perceive in "the Constitution" the sacrifice of their independence, but they did not conceive that the case was desperate, and proposed to comply with the orders of the King to select advisers, though these were not empowered to concur in any centralized representation.

Up to the middle of February, 1848, nothing had been done that could not be recalled. The caution of the mode of procedure, the determined manner in which it was met, alike gave promise of the adoption

of a course which should prevent the catastrophe of civil war; and this solution was the more to be expected from the fact that, in the then reigning agitation of men's minds, the crown of Denmark, which had ever had a leaning towards those dependencies which, in the Chancery style of Denmark were "personal" to itself, had in the Duchies a sure support. The dews of faction however watered the seeds which an enemy had sown, and the popular party prepared the way for Russia's combinations at Copenhagen no less effectually than at Berne or Bucharest, Paris or Palermo. We must now glance at the internal events which reversed in a few days the relative position of the parties.

There were on the accession of Frederick VII. three parties: that of the Court, that of the Liberals, and that of the Duchies. The Court looked to the Duchies as a Bulwark against the popular invasion, and deprecated an amalgamation which would reduce them to a powerless minority. It sided therefore, with the Duchies, and both were united against the Radicals. The objects of the Liberals were the diminishing of the royal prerogative, the establishing of a representative constitution, and a centralized administration; with these views, the facsimile of those of Paris, they associated Danism, the counterpart of the Germanism of Frankfort. In both points the obstruction they met, and the danger they had to apprehend, proceeded from the Duchies. In them were planted the *hereditary* roots of the monarchy; they clung to old rights, despised new theories and rejected proffered liberties. There was

a country ^{subject} subject to the King, but not ~~suited~~ to the kingdom; there was an army of which the King could dispose, there a place of refuge whither in a possible contingency he might fly. The Duchies at once presented a popular triumph to achieve, a Danish territory to incorporate, and a German principle to subdue.

The provoking tenacity with with the two factions of this Vendée of the north clung to each other, rendered it impossible to hope to obtain both the latter objects, and their option was expressed in the frantic cry, "Denmark to the Eyder." The practical point was the rupture of their Federal Bond.

Holstein backed by the German people, and linked to the German Confederation, it was dangerous to attack, and hopeless to subdue; Schleswig could be attacked and subdued only by isolating it. The plan was therefore simply this, to incorporate Schleswig and cut Holstein adrift; hence the anomaly of a simultaneous proposition of "incorporation" and "separation." By this single blow they expected to get rid of German interference, to extend Danish nationality, to deprive the crown of a German fief, to take from it the support of the Conservative Duchies, and place it in a position in which it could no longer resist the elevation of parliamentary Privilege on the ruins of royal Prerogative and popular rights.

Now will be understood the object of the proposal of the King, in the nomination of "men of experience." He was himself to nominate sixteen, eight

for Denmark, and eight for the Duchies; Denmark was to choose eighteen, and the Duchies as many. The sixteen nominees and the eighteen men of the Duchies secured to him a majority against the radical views, including the separation of the Duchies and the dismemberment of the kingdom. This arrangement unquestionably held out to the Duchies the hopes of an adjustment, against which they would have closed the door by refusing to nominate delegates. The radical party were disappointed in their hopes, but encouraged by the concession, and immediately made use of it to arouse the spirit of the Capital. They had recourse to the process of clubs and petitions, and were soon able to assume the tone of menace and an attitude of intimidation.”*

Now came the news from Paris. Every where it is the same story: be it Beckarest—be it Palermo—be it Presburg—be it Vienna—be it Berlin—be it Copenhagen—be it Rendsberg, at each, events are, at the close of February, 1848, conducted to that point where the narrator has to say, “Now came the news of Paris, and the explosion took place.” “preordinations of good luck”† too remarkable to overlook; too elaborate to explain.

* It is to be observed that the Royal Power was attacked through the Duchies. The Court Ministry were held up to public odium as “*Danish Schleswig-Holstein*.” In the *Faædrelandet* (the movement paper) the Ministry of Count Moltke is denounced for having for its principal object “the preservation of Holstein,” and he is charged with being equally ready to sacrifice “*Danism* in the one Duchy, and *Germanism* in the other.”

† Lord Malmesbury.

The Moltke ministry fell. The men of the Clubs, the men whose watchword was "Denmark to the Eyder," who had threatened to write with the sword the laws of Denmark on the backs of the Duchies, came into power. In their hands was now to be the nomination of the sixteen members appointed by the Crown, and under their influence were to be elected the eighteen Danes. There were no longer three parties—the Court was absorbed into the Liberals, and nothing stood in the way of the plans of the Casino—a centralized administration, Schleswig a Danish province,* Holstein cast to Frankfort, or any other monster, with an appetite for the meal.

The news of the change of ministry produced the explosion in the Duchies. The following is a Danish view of the event :

"On January 28th, 1848, the King signed an ordinance, by which he conferred a *constitution* on his States, with a common Chamber for the kingdom, and the two Duchies to be assembled regularly at fixed periods in places to be deter-

* "His Majesty King Frederick VII. and his councillors, however adverse to acknowledging the rights of the Duchies (in regard to the succession) have nevertheless for a time opposed so violent and unjust a demand. For it was but a few weeks prior that his Majesty had pledged his word 'that at least the present union of the two Duchies should be respected.' * * * *
"By assembling the populace before the King's palace, by omñous votes of want of confidence, and by direct threats, did they force the King to dismiss his ministry," &c.—*Memoir of the Provisional Government of Schleswig Holstein.*

“mined afterwards and alternately in the Kingdom
“and the Duchies.

“The Constitution was to be submitted for examination to Deputies, of which the majority
“should be elected by the Provincial States, the
“same number for the Duchies as for the Kingdom,
“though the population of the former was not equal
“to that of the kingdom.

“The Separatist party in the Duchies did not
“conceal their dissatisfaction at this royal act of
“favour. On the 17th of February, 1848, an
“assembly was held at Kiel to consult on the steps
“to be taken, and it was decided to choose Deputies
“opposed to the Union.

“Whilst parties were in this position of mutual
“apprehension and embarrassment, intelligence arrived of the events at Paris, and the Schleswig-Holsteiners regarded the opportunity arrived for
“realizing those projects. A meeting of members
“of the States of the two Duchies took place at
“Rendsburg the 18th of March, 1848, when it
“was determined to send a deputation to Copenhagen to represent to the King the desires of his
“subjects in the Duchies, and the state of the
“country.

“The establishment of a separate constitution
“for Schleswig Holstein, based on universal
“suffrage, formation of a civic guard, complete
“freedom of the Press and of meeting, immediate
“union of Schleswig to the Confederation,
“immediate dismissal of President Scheel: such

“were in substance the demands addressed to the King.

“Messrs. Beseler, Reventlow, Preetz, and Bargum, were authorised again to convene the Assembly in case of emergency. The Deputation left Kiel the 21st.

“The news of the Assembly at Rendsburg reached Copenhagen early in the morning on the 20th, together with the intimation that the Deputation would arrive two days after. The sensation it caused was very great. That evening (20th March) there was a great meeting at the Casino (club), when it was determined to solicit the King to change his Ministry and elect another who had sufficient determination and energy to defend the rights of the Crown in regard to Schleswig, whilst yielding to Germany what should be demanded in regard to Holstein. The following morning a deputation presented an address to the King, who replied that the Ministry was dissolved, and another should be formed, which did not take place until three days afterwards (24th). It is superfluous to repeat that the King could not give an answer to the Deputation of Kiel before the formation of the new Ministry. They therefore could not leave Copenhagen before the evening of the 24th. But before their departure the revolt had already broken out in Holstein. The night of the twenty-third or twenty-fourth, without waiting for the reply of the King, it was decided at Kiel to appoint a Provisional

"Government. The Prince of Augustenburg
"immediately repaired to Rendsburg on the
"morning of the twenty-fourth, where he seduced
"the garrison to embrace the side of the revolt,
"on the pretext that the King was a prisoner at
"Copenhagen."

WAR BETWEEN DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

Now at last we have the quarrel made and each party accusing the other of having commenced it. But what is the quarrel about? Not certainly the succession of the Crown, yet this was the cause of the difference. They make a war, and it is on other grounds, a war of nationality. This war of animosity is to prevent by mutual hatred the Duchies from accepting the Cognate, the Danes the Agnate branch and so render impossible a settlement of the succession so as to preserve the integrity of the kingdom: in mutual recriminations and wrongs they have not only lost sight of their object, but have ceased to desire it. On the spur of passion, in the heat of apprehension, they are precipitated into bloodshed without so much as statement or explanation.

Rendsburg being occupied by the insurgents, the Danes, in the beginning of April, 1848, enter the Duchies with 10,000 men, and attack Flensburg. The insurgent force, amounting to half that number, who are driven from their positions, fly in the greatest disorder towards the Eyder,—when a foreign army presents itself, which, travelling by railroad, had reached and crossed Holstein, and was now advancing through Schleswig to their support!

The case was an insurrection: it was a domestic affair. There was a civil war, indeed, but no foreign power had been attacked, or had declared war against Denmark; they all appeared to ignore the existence of the feud. If this army was a private levy, such as that of the sympathisers in Canada, the Texas or Cuba, they were pirates, and not less so if they consisted of the troops of a Government. There are precedents for the illegal interference of a Government to support another Government against insurrection, but hitherto there had been no instance of a Government overstepping the law of nations and constituting itself a party to an insurrection without conforming to the ordinary rules and declaring war. This new course was reserved for the nineteenth century to witness, for Prussia to perpetrate, and Europe to endure.

But whatever the unscrupulousness of that Cabinet, whatever the baseness of the rest of Europe, how comes Prussia to put herself forward in this matter! The act invites inquiry into her position, and imposes the necessity of fathoming her motives.

Whatever the amount of power acquired by Prussia in the course of the last century, she had been reduced at the close of the last war to the condition of a third rate state. She was at that time reconstructed afresh, not by her own means or dexterity, but through the policy of another Government, the same which in the same Congress obtained the final cession of Poland. It was at the time pointed out by the ablest diplomatist present (Talleyrand) that Russia's object was to have in Prussia a dependant

through which she could act on Germany. This reconstruction of Prussia took place at the expense of all her neighbours, Russia excepted—namely, of Saxony, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark; so that no alliance could take place between these Governments and the Cabinet of Berlin, whilst that Cabinet had to seek against them the support of that of St. Petersburg. The dismemberment of the two Scandinavian kingdoms took place in a manner which bears directly on the question at issue. In 1814 Norway was taken from Denmark, the pretended compensation of Swedish Pomerania being given in exchange; in 1815 Swedish Pomerania was taken from Denmark, and given to Prussia, who was made to surrender, as a pretended compensation, Lauenburg to Denmark. She thus stood to Denmark as a partitionary power, and in the troubles of that country she might see a prospect of reincorporating Lauenburg.

The troubles of Denmark further aided her views on Germany. In the well known dispatch of Pozzo de Borgo, reviewing in 1829 the interests and positions of the Powers of Europe in reference to Russia's designs on Turkey, he passes over Prussia as a Government which could give to Russia no umbrage; he speaks of it as one whose *part* was adjusted (*la Prusse a son rôle tout fait*): she had, he says, "*the objects of her ambition under her hand*:" he defines that *rôle* as one of encroachment (*empietemens*). To know all this required no revelation, but here we have it in the most unquestionable shape.

It was in Germany that these encroachments were to take effect she was to balance, then subvert Austria. The present King did not yield to his predecessor in those qualities and in that ambition (if the word may be so employed) which had been signalised in his predecessor. To him was made to apply the old monkish prophecy,

*Pastor expectat gregem,
Germania, regem.*

And it failed not to be remarked that his accession had occurred in the corresponding year of this century to that of Frederick the Great in the last, and of the great Elector in the one which had preceded it.

The explosion of 1848 came, Prussia was one of the first victims: she was not only swept internally by the revolutionary fury, but nearly driven by it against her northern Protector. The Kings succeeded in turning on the Poles the popular frenzy excited against Russia: then a diversion was furnished in the Duchies, and on Danism and Scandinavianism was to be expended the young fervor so troublesome at Frankfort, so alarming at Berlin. But it was not that a door was to be opened to military enterprise. Revolution was to be shamed by discomfiture, and to be put down by disgrace, as well as by exhaustion. The evident policy of the King of Prussia, as regarded reaction, the German monarchy, Lauenburg, and Holstein, tallied with the services required from him by Russia in furtherance of her views on Denmark.

But this unparalleled outrage could not be dared

without some pretence of justification. A manifesto was not even deemed a proper channel for such a pleading. A wholly new process was adopted, one indecorous in its form as it was pitiable in its contents—a pamphlet, printed in English, and published in London, purporting to be “A Memoir” addressed to the British Foreign Minister, and having appended to it the signature of the representative of Prussia. Mr. Bunsen has at least proved that in this age devotion is not extinct, and that men are to be found ready, like the Persian of old, to undergo any mutilation of fame or face, when there are despots to serve and Babylonians to circumvent.*

This memoir begins with fifty-six pages of special pleading on incorrect data—of self-contradiction and “cheap” exposure of the follies of the opposite party; then follows a *Postscript* to which is consigned the object of the publication, the announcement of the fact of the piratical invasion, which had just taken place. The pretexts which are adduced are beneath criticism, but I pause here to offer some remarks suggested by the Memoir itself.

Mr. Bunsen labours to prove that the Duchies are inseparably united. This position, true in itself as regards the obligations of the King of Denmark to the Duchies, he uses to establish a right of German interference as regards Schleswig, and

* Mr. Bunsen was all the while representing himself as the warm friend and devoted advocate of the Duchies, who were made to believe that this memoir was, on his part, an act of devotion by which he compromised his official existence.—*Note to Second Edition.*

thereupon constitutes the entrance of Danish troops into that undisputed fief of the Danish Crown, an attack on Germany in general and Prussia in particular. If the argument cuts one way it also cuts another, and the "indissoluble connexion" bars all interference of Germany in the affairs of Holland ; but whatever the value of the argument, was ever such a justification heard of, for an invasion !

But so soon as this corner is turned the indissoluble union is cast away, and the pretended negotiation closes with the positive proposal to cut Schleswig in two, and on the rejection of this condescending offer the troops march, and the responsibility of the "attack" is thrown on the King of Denmark.

That monarch is then told that he has been befooled from the beginning—that nothing was easier than to prevent all this trouble by the mere adoption of the Agnatic line of Denmark. Most true—and Prussia knows all this ! Why then was it not urged in 1846 ?—why is it urged in April 1848 ?—Why is it then published as a railing accusation, and cast as an additional impediment in the way of a settlement ?

In respect to the claims of Russia, Mr. Bunsen contradicts himself, asserting (p. 3) that the question had no European interest by the fact of Russia's renunciation, and (p. 19) denying the validity of that renunciation on the grounds that the Gottorp line had no claims to renounce. Was it not the part of the Prussian Government to ascertain the views

of the Russian Government respecting its own claims before making forward assertions, whether vague or precise, and declarations whether coherent or contradictory? Had not this enquiry to be made before entering the territory with an armed force? Can any one believe that the Invasion or the Declaration was so made, or doubt that the Minister of a Power so dependant, and an individual so astute,* should thus venture to sneer alike at Russia's claims and acts—unless by authority? Such language on the part of Prussia and such conduct, could never have been endured, had it not been commanded.

Throughout the Memoir there is no further allusion to Russia; but in the introduction to which the name of another person is appended, Russia is pointed out as the ally—"the only Ally" of this "ill-advised monarch," "an Ally who never yet refused the appeal of a King whose despotic tendencies had roused his subjects against him:" the Danes and the Duchies are alike warned against an artful Government who makes use of their mutual

* Mr. Bunsen on philosophical grounds, namely, the civilizing and the "Japhetising" of the Orientals, professes his anxious desire to see the power of Russia established on the Bosphorus. On Germanic grounds, he devotes himself in the cause of preventing her ascendancy on the Sound. He is, no doubt, not destitute of valid reasons by which to reconcile the apparent discrepancy, if discrepancy there be. To his diplomatic management Russia is chiefly indebted for the last result: she is possessed of no agent more indefatigable or tortuous; none have worked for her with more consciousness or premeditation; he is to be found at every corner with a different story, and able to effect for her what her avowed agents could not accomplish.

misunderstandings to get possession of the Sound. Who after this can doubt the sincerity of Prussia, or her watchfulness over the interest of Germany and of Europe?

The Preface warns both Duchies and Denmark against Russia: the Memoir warns the Duchies against France. It is to Germany, or more properly to Prussia that the Duchies owe their fearful agitations and their present sufferings, and the miseries and extinction that awaits them.

In 1806 there was an attempt on the part of Denmark to unite them to the kingdom; it was resisted, not by Germany, but by the Duchies themselves, and specially by the protest of the Duke of Augustenburg.* The revival of the attempt was occasioned by the connection of Holstein with the Federation; for according to the Treaties of 1815, the members were to have States-General and Constitutions: so while the Duchies were deluded into the hope of the revival thereby of their ancient constitution, to Denmark was offered the temptation of separating the Duchies by a constitution to be granted to Holstein. The Germans are filled with zeal for this Holstein constitution: where is their anxiety for that of Prussia and of the other members? The futile agitation in Germany produced the counter

* The family of Vasa then reigned in Sweden, and the Swedish Government protested also against the act. The Danish Government apprehending similar opposition from Russia, instructed its representative there to declare that this union did not effect the ultimate succession; in fact, Germany took no part on this important crisis.

Danish agitation at Copenhagen which broke the measures of the Court, forced the radical party into power, brought the war, prolonged it, closed it with an *Austrian* occupation, to be followed by a *Danish* despotism, and concluded by a *Russian* protectorate and possession.

Mr. Bunsen answers three arguments of Denmark for the superseding of the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg, viz., the letters-patent of 1721, the act of homage of the same date, and the Gottorp renunciation; but the letters-patent of Christian VIII. put forward a fourth argument, namely, the guarantees of England and France of the 14th of June and 23rd of July, 1720. Towards the close of the Memoir he deals with this subject in a special manner, and the Memoir concludes with asserting that "the guarantee must be supposed to have ceased when it lost its object," and that it so lost its object by the renunciation of the House of Gottorp. This application is wholly upset by the terms of the Treaty of 1727, wherein France and England declare their obligation to "execute the guarantee they had given against any invasion or hostility on the part of the Czarine or of *any power whatsoever* which should *come and attack the Duchy of Schleswig*." Now, admitting the guarantee to be of no value, as of course it is not, against the House of Augustenburg, it is of value against, and exactly provides for, the act of *Prussia*: therefore is the point separated from the other arguments and then perverted, and (the announcement of Prussia's act

being thrown into a postscript) it is disposed of before the event is known.*

Prussia's consciousness of the weakness of her case, or rather of the impossibility of making out any, is shown in the straits to which a man of Mr. Bunsen's ability is reduced ; and yet this is a pleading of a great government on which, it says, that it awaits the " verdict " of the " people of England."

Prussia having apparently got this verdict, and being constituted belligerent and neutral—party and mediator † at once—let us resume the military march of this history.

The Danes advanced upon the town of Schleswig, occupied it, and took up a position to the south. On the 23rd April, the Prussians amounting to 14,000 men accompanied by the troops of the Duchies, reinforced to 8000 say 22,000 in all, advanced and drove them back. On the north of Schleswig, a defile and a dyke bars the passage, and the Danish army must have been annihilated, had not the Prussian General discovered that his troops wanted nourishment: the recall was sounded. The commander of the Holsteiners, the Prince of Schleswig Holstein, remonstrated

* The King of Prussia addressed an autograph letter to the Duke of Augustenburg in March 1848, to give him the assurance of *his right* being supported.

† The Prussian troops enter to support the "basis of mediation" in consequence of the German Federation having, *through Prussia*, offered "its own mediation," and because "to have waited one moment longer would have been to stultify Germany."
—*Memoir*, p. 58.

with the Prussian General Wrangel, who answered, "It is my affair not yours, the responsibility rests with me, nothing," he added, "is lost—the Danish army is beaten, and with the reinforcement of the troops of the Confederation, it will be annihilated in a week; it is but fair to reserve some of the laurels for them."

The troops of Hanover, Mecklenburgh, Oldenburg, and Brunswick arrived in great numbers, and the following morning the pursuit was to commence. The infantry on foot and the cavalry, mounted from 4 o'clock in the morning, were however kept to observe the Danes as they quietly defiled, when allowed five hours start they were pursued, but the Prussians being pushed out right and left were not so fortunate as to overtake them. The Confederates under the Duke of Brunswick, and General Halkett were more lucky, but so soon as the firing attracted the attention of the Prussian Commander-in-Chief, the recall was sounded. When it was pointed out to General Wrangel, that the Danes, unless intercepted, would seek refuge under the guns of their ships, he replied, "God knows where they will go." The Danes had abandoned their artillery and baggage at Flensburg, but afterwards they returned, harnessed their horses, and without molestation carried them off to the Isle of Alsen. On the return of the Duke of Brunswick, a stormy but fruitless altercation ensued, and the Duke sick of Prussian strategy, quitted the camp and returned home.

The whole of the Danish forces had been em-

ployed, and had been beaten and repulsed, they were unable to undertake anything, but yet they were concentrated at Alsen, where they were in communication with their ships, and while defended by the narrow strait from attack, were ready on any favourable turn, again to cross into Schleswig. The Duchies were freed from the enemy and occupied by a victorious army of 53,000 men; the war had therefore to be carried into Denmark proper. General Wrangel entered Jutland with the main force, leaving 20,000 of the confederates to watch the Danes at Alsen, who at the utmost amounted to 15,000. Nevertheless, General Halkett allowed the Danes to cross the strait, to establish a *tête du pont*, to construct a bridge, to seize on the heights which commanded it, on them to build redoubts, and plant heavy artillery! When these operations had been completed, he commenced operations, besieging the newly constructed works, he placed his troops in a half circle round Duppel; this point being in direct communication with the *tête du pont* and the island, could in a single night be occupied by the whole Danish force, which would then find itself in the centre of the Germans, and be able by a sortie to beat and destroy them in detail. This was foreseen by the whole army of the besiegers, except the General, and it was executed with equal facility and success by the besieged.

On the 28th of May at the dawn of day, the Danes fell upon the Germans with their entire force. Halkett sent aides-du-camp to order up one divi-

sion after another—each in succession arrived too late.

But where was General Wrangel? Master of Jutland* at the least, for the whole Danish force was at Duppel. Not at all: he had evacuated Jutland; *his* movement was accounted for by a “*secret order*” from Berlin.

But surely he must have been still in Jutland when this disaster befell General Halkett. By no means: he had entered Schleswig four days before, on the 24th of May, and was marching on Duppel; the distance was twenty leagues, but happened to arrive too late.

A numerous army, finding itself beaten and baffled at every turn by an enemy which it had defeated, could not be kept silent even by Prussian discipline, and it became necessary to undertake something; it appeared, however, that the choice of defeat was the only option allowed to the Prussian General. An attack was now made on the Danish redoubts, and the Prussian guard met with no better success than the Hanoverians and

* “Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein, the then Commander of the troops of the Duchies, *protested* and *remonstrated* against passing the frontier of Jutland on the 1st of May, 1848. This measure was not only suggested, but ‘imperatively ordered by General Wrangel.’ Prince Frederick represented that the Duchies carried on a wholly ‘*defensive*’ war, and not an ‘*offensive*’ one. He then wanted his corps to be left as a reserve to the Confederate Army on the northern frontier of Schleswig. This too was overruled; and this forced step furnished one more argument to prove the rebellious intentions of the Duchies!”—*Note by a Schleswig-Holsteiner.*

Mecklenburghers,—and so ended the first campaign.

Prussia had taken part in the war as the ally of the Duchies: now, without their knowledge, she made an arrangement with the enemy with respect to the movements of the troops of both parties. This arrangement did not affect a single isolated point; as, for instance, the evacuation of Jutland, but every operation of the war.

But the Duchies disappear; the parties are now the Confederation and Denmark, and an arrangement between Denmark and Prussia is entered into to divide the two Duchies, the inseparable union of which was the pretext of Prussia's interference! At least, then, after this compact, it only remains to arrange the conditions of peace.

But it was not for this that M. de Cazes had been despatched to Copenhagen; the memoir of M. Bunsen penned—the recall sounded at Flensburg, and the Prussian guards sacrificed at Duppel. England now appeared on the stage as mediatrix.

The terms “mediation,” “conference,” “protocol,” conjure up hideous and mysterious phantoms. Nothing can happen in Europe, Asia, in the New World, or on the coasts of Africa without a London protocol—could the Duchies escape? Let us examine this matter according to the true interests of England, and the dull generous character of her people, forgetting for the moment the slippery and inexplicable activity of her diplomacy.

The dismemberment of Denmark threatened to compromise the peace of Europe, and might furnish

an opportunity for encroachments to Russia, or France, or Prussia : England could see therein only a misfortune. But in addition there was for her a consideration of the highest order. The independence of a small maritime state was at stake—a State which held the passage of the Sound, so that, besides three dangerous chances, there was one certain danger. It was not that France or Prussia might extend their territory or influence, but that Russia might close the Baltic, and issue on the ocean. England had also simple and positive duties to fulfil ; she was bound to maintain the integrity of the Danish territory against all aggression : there was no impediment to the fulfilment of that guarantee—no such impediment has ever been alleged ; as to Prussia and the German Confederation, a single word sufficed to arrest them. France was under the same obligations as England. But there was no need of considering the dispositions of the Powers, the word that would have sufficed to arrest the invasion would have sufficed to prevent the dispute. The occasion was an interference with the constitution of the Duchies by the King of Denmark : England, therefore, had to say to him, “ I am bound to defend you against aggression, but I have the right to demand that you shall not provoke attack.”

England did the very reverse. She sanctioned the aggression of the King of Denmark against the Duchies, and the aggression of the King of Prussia against Denmark : she acknowledged the obligation of the Treaty, to encourage Denmark, and abstained

from executing it, to encourage Prussia. In a word, she fixed the quarrel by supporting both parties, and then withdrew from them every means of adjustment, by constituting herself mediatrix. Perfect harmony reigned between the action of England and Prussia. The latter lent to the Duchies, armies, while she secured to Denmark victories. The former lent to Denmark the encouragement of words, to the Duchies and their allies, that of impunity; and as in the warlike operations of the one, nothing can be granted to the inexperience of the General—so in the diplomatic combinations of the other, nothing can be explained by the incapacity of the Minister.

England's conduct is as explicable as that of France or that of Prussia, but by the rule once suggested by M. Thiers, "You have mistaken your parts, you have mistaken the interests of Russia for your own."

The effect of the mediation was simply to allow six months to the parties to recruit their strength. The second campaign opened by the entrance of 20,000 Danes into Schleswig. The Duchies mustered a nearly equal force, consisting however in a considerable degree of German volunteers and Prussians; they were commanded by a Prussian general, Bonin, who had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to supersede the General of the Duchies.*

* Whilst Prince Frederick, General-in-Chief of the army of the Duchies, was in Schleswig trying to reorganise his troops, a deputy at the Diet at Kiel observed that "Fortune favoured the Duchies by giving them the opportunity of obtaining a distin-

There soon arrived 50,000 troops of the Confederation, of which nearly the half were Prussians; in fact, the Duchies furnished to the King of Prussia a Siberia and a Circassia, where the turbulent found occupation and the seditious repose.

The Danes were speedily driven back, and following them the Schleswig-Holsteiners entered Jutland, and were soon joined by the Prussians, under General Pritwitz, who had succeeded General Wrangel. He divided this powerful army into two bodies; the one composed of Prussians and Hessians was sent in pursuit of a body of Danes, a third of their number. The Schleswig Holsteiners, to the amount of 14,000, were dispatched to blockade Fredericia, which was *open to the sea*, of which the Danes had the command! The heights of Goulsk, three leagues from the fortress, were crowned with redoubts; these were taken by assault, and the victors pursuing the fugitives might have entered the fortress with them, when the Prussian's recall sounded. A blockade being perceived to be of no possible use, it was resolved to besiege the place in form; the army sat down before it, and the works were commenced. If the Danes had chosen a point by attacking which their adversaries would uselessly waste their strength, and give them an

“guished Prussian officer as their general, whose appointment “would avert such disasters as those which had occurred.” The Prince on this sent in his resignation, and two days after General Bonin arrived, empowered by an order of the Prussian Cabinet, to accept the command of the army of the Duchies against Denmark, with whom Prussia had just concluded an armistice!

opportunity of striking, without risk, a fatal blow, it would have been Fredericia to which, lying on the sea, the whole Danish army could be brought, or from which, the garrison might at pleasure be removed. The Danes at Alsen were watched by the brave troops of the Confederation; those in Jutland were pursued by the Prussians. Both corps give their several antagonists the slip, and enter the place, while the Confederates and the Prussians remain at their posts in observation! General Bonin was familiar with the place, having been stationed there for four weeks during the preceding year. The reinforcements were daily seen entering the fortress, till the place was crammed full of men, and the besieged far out-numbered the besiegers; yet the siege was continued, and the men kept in the entrenchments; the bombardment was discontinued "not to exasperate the enemy," but the enemy never ceased his fire. The army could not restrain its discontent and its alarm. The General justified himself by saying that his measures were concerted with General Pritwitz, who would be on the spot when necessary. One morning the Danes came, but Pritwitz did not. That day the sun rose over the wrecks of the camp and of the Confederation army, whilst the besieged carried into the fortress the fifty guns which had fallen into their hands. It is to be observed that Fredericia is in Jutland: the Prussians can attack Jutland, but the Danes dare not enter Holstein! This achievement constitutes the campaign of 1849.

But the sea, treacherous by nature, had its part

here to play. The Germans were enthusiastic about ships, and resolved to have a navy, not because they had a coast and colonies, but precisely because they had none. The first event in their maritime annals occurred on the 4th of June, 1849, when three steam vessels built in England, with gunners taught on board the "Excellent," and carrying 68-pounders, issued from the Weser to amuse themselves with firing at a mark on the tranquil ocean. When about to begin this exercise, they perceived the smoke of a steamer coming out of the Elbe, and they soon made her out to be a Dane, and gave chase. The steamer distanced them; but they fell unexpectedly on a Danish corvette, under Heligoland, where she was enjoying the sunshine, and drying her sails. The little steam squadron dignified itself with a broad pendant; the "commodore" was Mr. Brommy,* who, after some shots were exchanged, steered away. The astonishment of the inhabitants of Heligoland at such desperation on the part of the "pirates"† may be easily imagined. The Governor, himself a sailor, had just exclaimed, "Poor corvette, five minutes more and

* Mr. Brommy began by being a cabin-boy on board a Hamburg vessel, and after several changes of fortune found himself lieutenant of a corvette taken from the Turks by Lord Cochrane during the Greek war, and afterwards commander of a steamer; but he arrived in Greece only after the close of the struggle.

† Lord Palmerston wrote to the Senate of Bremen to demand the reason why three pirate steamers under an imaginary flag had issued from the Weser to attack a Danish ship in the neutral waters of Heligoland. Obviously the Minister could not be deceived in the matter.

she must strike!" The "Commodore" obtained the decoration of Commander of the Order of Merit from Oldenburg, of the Guelph from Hanover, and some others. This is the beginning, progress, and termination of the history of a German fleet, unless the following fact is to be added as an appendix: Brommy was created Admiral, and thereupon the German empire expired.

The armistice of 1849 effected the original scheme of Prussia, the cutting of Schleswig into two parts. The Eyder was an inviolable line—that belonged to the Confederation; the parties were to retire, the one south of the Eyder, the other north of Schleswig: then a line is drawn from Tondern to Flensburg; and neutrals are to be stationed on either side; Swedes and Norwegians on the north; Prussians and Oldenburghers on the south. These neutrals! Why, they had just been engaged; but Holstein, too, is neutral in its territory, while belligerent in its troops; Schleswig is to be evacuated by her own troops; they are to occupy a neutral territory,—Holstein! By these monstrosities the contest is prolonged, Germany occupied, and the banners of Scandinavism and Germanism arrayed against each other on the Baltic, whilst the Muscovites are pouring down the Carpathians, and the Czar is allowed quietly to appropriate by propping up, the crown of the Cæsars which he had first cast into the mire.*

But in all this what part does Denmark play—does she not expose and denounce to Europe this

* "*Pas une couronne ne tombe dans la boue; qu'un de a cousins de Cobourg ne la ramasse.*"—NIGOLAS.

scandalous violation of all forms and all laws hitherto observed by nations and respected by men ? Denmark was quite safe ; she had been first put in the wrong ; she knew, besides, nothing of public law ;* and she had two confidential advisers—Russia and France.†

But the *armistice* having thus regulated affairs of war and peace, in its Proteus progress becomes a government. It institutes a triumvirate to govern the Duchies ; one of these to be appointed by Denmark ; of course, then, one will be appointed by the Duchies ; by no means, *Prussia* appoints the second. The third, who is to be the arbiter between the two and sole governor—how is he to be named ? The Queen of England is to appoint him ; still, however, on the condition—a condition which does honour to the forethought of the Conference, that he shall be acceptable to *both* parties. The person selected was one against whom both parties formally protested, and it was precisely by means of this double protest that the appointment was made.

Colonel Hodges had first distinguished himself—if the expression may be so applied—amongst the

* A Danish class-book defines "Declaration of war"—"a formality formerly considered necessary, but now *generally omitted*."

† It was only too much to be feared that the plan now proposed was nothing but the execution of the project which the late French Government had recommended, and as it appears with a decided promise of French support against any claims of the Germanic Diet and the German nation."—*Bunsen*, p. 31.

mercenaries sent to Spain to put down the Basques; he was consequently selected for an important and delicate post which had just been created—that of British Consul in Servia (1837). At this time the “entente cordiale” reigned between England and France, there had been then no Syrian war, no Pritchard affair, and no Spanish marriages. Servia was of all points in Europe that where the opposition most displayed itself of Russian schemes and English interests, and with a view to this very antagonism the post had been created. Yet on Colonel Hodges applying for instructions, and endeavouring to elicit some directions as to his course by putting cases inferring that he would be thwarted by Russia and supported by France, he was answered in these words:—“You deceive yourself if “you expect to receive a real support from France, “and you will see that it is not Russia that England will have occasion to distrust.” It is needless to say how Colonel Hodges acted under the impression of these prophetic words, what troubles he raised in Servia, what embarrassments he occasioned to Sir Stratford Canning, not equally confided in by their common chief; so well did he do his patron’s work that when the country rose to cast out the creature of Russia, their then Prince, it was chiefly against the agent of England that this fury was directed, and he had to fly. “When he arrived “he found his consular duties slight; but events “were stirring of the greatest importance, and he “threw himself into the heat of every political intrigue, so that in the course of eighteen months

“he had produced such a complication of circumstances as would take two ambassadors extraordinary to resolve. The Noble Viscount did not recall him, and for this reason Colonel Hodges was driven out, the Prince he had supported lost his throne, the house of Colonel Hodges was burnt, and he fled to Vienna.”* His zeal, however, was soon rewarded by a better post, the Consulate-General of Egypt, and when in course of time a cooler one became again requisite, he was removed to Hamburgh.

This was the man whom the Queen of England was advised to propose as third member for the Duchy of Schleswig. His nomination produced such exasperation that Prussia was compelled to protest and thereby, according to the terms of the Armistice, to exclude him from the Commission.

But in London they were prepared for this occurrence: the Danish Minister protested likewise. Lord Palmerston, provided with these documents, presented himself to his colleagues. “Here is,” said he, “in this hand the protest of the Duchies “against my nomination; in that, that of Denmark.” His colleagues bowed again as they had often done before, and the conditions of the Convention were held to be fulfilled in the impartiality of the Minister.

At length the armistice reached its term, and the campaign recommenced its course. Prussia had made peace with Denmark, and the enthusiasm of

* Mr. D'Israeli, March 8th, 1842.

the troops of the German Confederation was cooled. The Swedes and the Norwegians who had been transformed into neutrals were embarked and sent home, and for the first time the business is left to the two parties.

Denmark with great efforts had been able to assemble 40,000 men with ninety-six guns: her maritime strength need not be reckoned, being of little or no avail. With this force she could not expect to conquer the Duchies, and she had the certainty before her eyes that their defeat and her triumph would reawaken enthusiasm and exasperation in Germany, and excite another tide of invasion. How was it, then, that no thought arose of an accommodation? On their side the Duchies could expect nothing from the continuation of the war, and still less from the interposition of their foreign allies. It is difficult to conceive how both were kept from remarking that the aggregate effect of this endless intermeddling was simply mutual exhaustion, being left always to fight, but never allowed to fight it out, in a difference which had originally sprung out of a common desire to avoid a separation. New incentives and stimulants had, however, been found requisite at Copenhagen. France sent a distinguished general, the celebrated Philhellénist Fabvier, to discourse of campaigns and suggest plans of operations, and Russia herself had come forward at length to smile on the undertaking. She allowed hopes of a subsidy to be entertained, sent a squadron to hover on the coasts, and, together with the use of steamers for the transport of troops,

lent to the enterprise that great modern invention —“moral support.”

The renewal of hostilities took place, indeed, by the act of the Duchies, who crossed the Eyder before the Prussians had retired beyond that canal, “manifestly with the connivance of the Prussian “General Hahn” to anticipate the Danes in securing that important line of defence, which crosses the isthmus at Isted.

Schleswig, the field to which this contest was circumscribed, is one hundred miles in length and not fifty in breadth; but in fact the arena was further narrowed to its southern extremity, and consisted in the maintenance of that ancient line of defence to the north of the town of Schleswig, where for 1000 years the Danes had taken their stand against the Emperors and Popes, and where may still be traced the ruins of the great lines constructed at that early period.

The forces employed were, in proportion to the means of the parties, enormous. If England in a civil war made a similar effort, her armies in the field would amount to 1,000,000 men. Denmark, as I have said, mustered 40,000, with ninety-six guns. The Duchies moved across the Eyder 30,000 men with eighty guns, chiefly of large calibre, leaving four battalions of reserve.

A causeway and military road leads from Flensburg, where the Danish troops, entering from Jutland or arriving by sea, would effect their junction, southward through the centre of the province to the town of Schleswig. On both sides the country

is difficult from broken ground and defensible positions, but principally because interspersed with bogs and marshes: some five or six miles in advance of Schleswig, a natural line of defence composed of lakes, marshes, steep banks of rivers, and forests extends across from east to west. The causeway passing by the village of Isted is inclosed in a gorge, the heights on the left being backed by the long lake of "Lang Sô," and on the right by almost continuous marshes. The heights on both sides were crowned by batteries of which the crossing fire enfiladed the passage, and these were strengthened by fieldworks and redoubts. Here was stationed the mass of the forces of the Duchies and of their artillery. Had the Danes been repulsed in an attack upon this position, they must have abandoned their offensive attitude, and the war would have terminated by their inability to effect anything, for the Duchies standing on the defensive only would not have prosecuted any advantage they might have obtained.

On the 24th July, 1850, the Danish army advanced on Isted, and drove in the outposts. The following morning at 2 o'clock, they made an attack at every point, sending out detachments right and left, to attempt the passages beyond the marshes and beyond the lake. They were however repulsed on all points, and at Stolk lost four guns and their best general Sbleppegrell, who had led the *sortie* at Frederica, beaten Wrangel at Duppel, and commanded on every occasion on which the Danes had been successful. After such a check it was not

to be supposed that the attack could be renewed with discouraged troops, and without any necessity; but at nine o'clock, they were on every point brought again to the charge and again repulsed. The troops of the Duchies were inferior in numbers by 10,000 men, and their sole business was to defend their strong position; they had been under arms for twenty-four hours, and had had to sustain one assault during the night, and one in the morning, and though excited by success, were exhausted and disordered; three reasons against pushing them on even had an advance movement been on other grounds imperative, but they were led against the enemy into the plan to *pursue their advantage*. When well advanced, a fresh body of 10,000 Danes falls upon them, drives them back, and enters the entrenchments with the fugitives.

As no general with the commonest qualifications could have been guilty of so gross an imprudence, it might be inferred that Prussia having now made peace with Denmark, had withdrawn her officers of experience, and left the Schleswig Holsteiners to the conduct of some provincial Hannibal; but Prussia was not so unmindful of her friends, and if prudent had not ceased to be considerate. She had not left them in so hopeless a predicament, and the catastrophe was therefore not to be laid to the charge of inconsiderate patriotism and inexperienced valour.

General Willisen won his spurs at the battle of Leipzig; during the peace he devoted himself to tactics, was professor of the military art, and published several works, which have become class-

books in Germany: but this branch did not suffice to absorb his talents. In the convulsions of 1848, the king of Prussia was in want of a "Pacifator" for Posen, and upon him fell the Royal choice. It may be recollected, though in these days memory is short, that in the first outbreak of revolutionary enthusiasm, the German people took it into its head to war with the Czar, and seriously proposed to drive Russia into the deserts of Asia and the snows of the Pole.

Revolution in the south and west presented only a local colour; but to the north and east, although it failed not to articulate the watchwords of freedom there was associated therewith the idea of independence. They saw Russia near and imminent, beetling like an iceberg over their heads, and menacing at every hour an avalanche. They well knew that no form of internal government could resist her invasion, or subsist if hostile to her views, so that the revolution in Prussia was just as much directed against the Emperor at St. Petersburg, as against the King in Berlin. It turned consequently to the Poles as its natural allies, and whilst calling out for "Free Press," "Free Meetings," "National Guard," and "Representative Chamber," it called out also for "Restoration of Poland:" it adopted as its philosophical conclusive, that its triumph was but temporary and incomplete till it had succeeded in disabling Russia from interfering in the forms of government of other countries. This it is which explains the momentary enthusiasm throughout Germany in the cause of Poland, and

the expectation of seeing the outburst of revolution, pour itself from that country over the north. This direction of the public mind would have united had they not been so before, the domestic and dynastic interests of the kings with the political ends of the Russian Cabinet. That of Prussia saw no safety save in those very auxiliaries which the people of Prussia looked upon as their deadliest foes. But that aid could not be obtained directly; the means of safety lay in establishing a schism between the Poles and the Germans. Some estimate may thus be formed of the qualities required for a Pacificator of Polish Posen: a man was requisite who knew how to combine heart with head.

Willisen played his part to admiration: he succeeded in presenting the king as the patron of the anti-Russian enthusiasm, and then returned to Berlin, apparently to counteract some secret machinations, by which his Royal Master had been overreached: he left his apartment after a long conference, at two o'clock in the morning, when the king addressing his court, which awaited, said, "Gentlemen, you want war with Russia; well, you shall have it," and on this, the secret order was dispatched for disarming the Poles. The shock of contradictory propositions, passion and mystery, exasperations and uncertainty effaced all anterior impressions; the public was at sea, and so—the anti-Russian projects fell, the revolutionary spirit evaporated, and the royal diplomacy triumphed at Berlin and in Posen, as at Duppel, and at Fredericia. Willisen was, it is true, accused of trea-

chery by one party, and therefore he was defended by the other : he himself published a voluminous defence, which every body devoured, but which no one could digest. It was, however, said to be much to the taste of his master, and the Emperor.

Willisen now took the road to Italy, and directed his steps to Piedmont. His liberal sympathies and Polish antecedents opened to him every door and every heart : he was conducted from position to position, from army to army. Passing from the military to the diplomatic branch, Ministers underwent his examination ; public offices opened themselves to his inspection. His review completed, he posted to Peschiera, and soon after returned with Radetzki, to visit his Sardinian friends : he so interested the Field Marshal by his conversation, that even with the pre-occupations of the field of Novara, he did not allow him for a moment to quit his side.*

* Already has the defeat at Novara been attributed to *one* act of treason, but the treason was much deeper than that of one General of Division. The Austrian and Piedmontese governments were both betrayed, the one to the other. The independence of Lombardy, which Austria offered through England on the 22nd of May, was filched away by the same process ; and the victory, secured by management to the Austrian arms in the south, was the signal for the blow struck at Hungary, where all was already prepared to sacrifice to Hungary the Austrian armies, and then Hungary to Russia. The warlike operations of these years were all made safe like those we have been examining. The Spanish marriages, the Confiscation of Cracow, the Swiss mediation, the disturbances of Italy and Sicily, the French, with its concomitant revolutions, are all facts which are linked together,

This adventure completed, Willisen again turned his face northwards, and opportunely reached Berlin at the very moment that the Peace with Denmark constrained the King to recall General Bonin. The successful "Pacificator" of Posen was exactly the man required. It is true that the objection which had caused the recall of his predecessor equally applied to him. He too was Prussian, Prussian officer and Prussian general: but seeing how Conventions are executed, and armistices observed, we must admit as good a distinction between General Willisen and General Bonin, as between the two sides of the demarcation line from Tondern to Flensburg. Thus it will be readily conceived that though at Isted General Bonin was no longer in command of the troops of the Duchies, the "Pacification of the North" lost nothing by the change.

After losing a strong position by an ambuscade, and sacrificing about 4000 men,—continuing to apply the maxims of strategy which he had been so long engaged in teaching, he fell by mathematical gravitation on the south, never stopping until he had placed behind him the fortress of Rendsburg. Evacuating or abandoning the whole of Schleswig, he withdrew behind the Eyder, which the neutrality of Holstein forbade the Danes to cross. His

and the process laid bare in regard to any, may be assumed to exist in respect to all.

I have been informed that I have mistaken General Willisen for his brother. If so, the King of Prussia is lucky in having *two* Willisens instead of one.

army, though defeated, had received reinforcements, which raised it far above its complement when it took the field, whilst that of the Danes, which had suffered nearly as severely as its antagonist, received no reinforcement whatever. It was in a hostile country, and had to strengthen and to fortify its various positions. In extending its operations, it was liable to be at any point attacked by the whole force of the Duchies from behind the Eyder, which is a river or canal cut from sea to sea, and across which it did not dare to venture, nay, not even to fire. General Willisen was a great admirer of the Napoleon combination of concentration, the art of which consisted in inducing the enemy to radiate his forces. Here the enemy had laid out for him the positions. He could attack them at any point with his whole force, and annihilate them separately; and he selects their two exposed positions to the extreme right and left; marching under cover of the Eyder, he attacks at both, and is repulsed. Thus ends the campaign; Willisen* returns home; and for the Duchies, of course, we will have an armistice.

N.B.—The subjoined extract from the public news, as printed in London on the 25th May, will

* Though now for the first time published, this paper has been circulated in manuscript, and the writer has received various rectifications especially as regards this battle. A pamphlet has been sent to him as containing the disproof of his account: he subjoins some extracts in the Appendix, see No. I.

fully justify the qualifications as tactician of the Prussian General ; other men win honours by gaining battles—they by losing them.

“ *Berlin, May 22.*

“ The Russian Imperial Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, sat opposite the Emperor and the King of Prussia, between the President of the Cabinet, M. von Manteuffel, and General von Wrangel, whose next neighbour was Count Orloff, the Russian *Minister of Police*. During dinner, the King himself called on the guests to fill their glasses to the brim (*bis zum Rande*), and gave the following toast :—

“ ‘ In my own name, and that of my army, and in the name of all true Prussian hearts, I give the health of His Imperial Majesty of Russia ! God preserve him to that portion of the world which God has given him for an inheritance, and to this age, to which he is indispensable.’

“ The Emperor replied, ‘ *Dieu conserve votre Majesté*,’ adding immediately afterwards in German,—‘ I drink to the welfare of the King of Prussia and *his admirable army*.’

“ The toast was drunk with the utmost enthusiasm, and the hall re-echoed with oft-repeated ‘ *Hochs !* ’ ”

In the same paper in which the above is reported, the “ *Times*,” observes :—“ The continent is governed literally, if not symbolically, by Colonels in Russian uniforms.”

AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF THE DUCHIES.
RUSSIAN EVACUATIONS OF THE PRINCIPALITIES.

No! This time the armistice is replaced by 20,000 Austrians. Protocols had hitherto sufficed to stop hostilities; and if neutrals were wanted, had not Prussians, Hanoverians, Mechlenburgers, Norwegians, and Swedes, all been transformed into that character? We have seen in the affair of Aleppo that Protocol was disposing itself to take flight from London to Paris: a Minister for Foreign Affairs, censured by a vote of the House of Lords, saved only by a small majority in the Commons, extorted by the menace of a dissolution, had for a time at least to walk softly. Besides, Austria was now so far quelled that these convenient documents could be safely replaced by an army of the Cæsars.

A more perfect exemplification of the process of breaking up a community has never been seen. First, Denmark and its Duchies ruptured; then the Duchies broken in two; the knife then passed through one of them. There is brought into play neither Russian art nor armies: it is all effected by impersonality and abstraction. First, we have Dynastic sympathies; then Constitutional freedom; and lastly, Popular impulse. These occupy

the stage in the first act of the drama ; in the second figure Federation and Mediation : in the third, "Danism" and "Germanism" grasp Schleswig and devour it. The Germans of Schleswig in the early part of the struggle, and when the anterior impressions remained, concurred with the Danes of the Duchies : it was not till the foreign German and the Danish troops compromised the natives in their mutual animosities, that they joined in this factitious bitterness. To conjure up a "Danism" as something distinct from "Germanism," was a folly outstripping any folly of which even Europe in recent times has been the theatre. Danes and Germans are of the same stock, and their language is more closely allied than that of Poland and Russia, than ancient and modern Greek. The Duchies had neither decreed, like the Hungarians, the dethronement of the King-Duke, nor proclaimed a new political creed like the Italians ; no speculative designation could be affixed to men who only claimed to continue to possess their own ; but, as you cannot excite passions without calling names, epithets had to be invented. There is this difference between their fate, and that of the other victims of 1848, they can look back without shame ; they have bravely fought ; they have indulged in no extravagant aims, and submitted only to necessity.

From the moment that the quarrel was established, Russia had accomplished her end : she triumphed, whoever won the victory, because her game was their division. She could be foiled only by an accommodation, and against that chance, she

is now definitely protected through the occupation by the troops of a Power depending on her for existence.* They will not retire, until a diplomatic settlement takes the matter of the Crown and succession out of the hands of the parties and transfers it to a conclave of foreign diplomatists. In the mean time the Duchies will be reduced politically to a level with the Principalities, with this exception, that they will not understand whence their sufferings come, and will turn their hopes towards their oppressor,—their animosity on their Sovereign and his people.

Regiments of that Hungary so recently placed “at the feet of the Czar,” are now marching to the shores of the Baltic, to subjugate to him the Sound. The occupation of the Principalities commenced that pacification of Hungary of which the occupation of the Duchies is the result; and at the moment of this inconceivable invasion of the Duchies by Austria, the Principalities are on the point of an incredible evacuation by Russia. It may be that from the beginning, all had been prepared and that “the feint on the Bosphorus was to secure the Sound.”† However, both points were on the cards: but in the Principalities Russia encountered an obstacle,—a man, an accident which did not befall her in the Duchies or in Europe.

In treating of contemporary events, it is rarely that we can connect the catastrophe with the march of

* Written it will be recollected in January, 1851.

† General Aupick, French Ambassador at Constantinople.

the Drama, still less so, when dealing not with a single transaction, but with a double event. This advantage we here possess. Russia, it is true, has only promised to evacuate: if her word be of little value, not so her necessities. It is because the first only is thought of, that so little credence is here given to the declaration, that the very Government disbelieves the victory it has achieved.

The Principalities afford to Turkey the most advantageous diplomatic field whenever she makes up her mind to stand up for herself. There Russia can neither put forward her allies, nor, as in Egypt, Syria, or Greece, play upon their mutual jealousies. Freed from such entanglements, Turkey is morally if not intellectually a match for Russia—physically, she is more than a match for her. It may be difficult to move the Turks, but once they have resolved, they will adhere to their point with more pertinacity, and carry it out with as much dexterity as any people on earth.

From the moment, therefore, that the Porte had said and decided that the Principalities should be evacuated, the thing was done. The manner of effecting it has been peculiar and characteristic.

The most offensive feature of the occupation was the charge for the support of the Russian troops, exacted without treaty or warrant, the Turkish troops conjointly occupying, being entirely defrayed by their own Government. The resources of the Provincial Government having failed, the Russian General offered to open for them a credit on St. Petersburg, and so they had become, by supplying

the Russians, indebted, to the amount of nearly twenty millions of piastres, to Russia. It was on this point that the Porte determined to raise the question, and she waited for an occasion.

The Hospodar of Wallachia, Stirbey, had proposed to place his son in the Russian diplomatic service, on this Achmet Effendi, Commissioner of the Porte, had taken offence. A Hospodar lies on no bed of roses when the Porte declares itself his adversary; and to regain its good will sacrifices had to be made or artifices employed; the plan devised was, that he should himself remonstrate against the Russian occupation. Consequently, Logotheti, Kapou Kiayah, of the Hospodar, and a notorious Russian agent, was commissioned to deliver to the Grand Vizier a memoir in which it was stated that the Province could no longer bear the burden of the Russian troops, and the Porte was urged to take measures, if not for their removal, at least for the reimbursement to the Provincial treasury. On presenting it, Logotheti said, "You will see that the Prince is not so black as Achmet Effendi would make you believe." The Grand Vizier answered, in his quiet way, "Very well, we will see what we can do for him." The Kapou Kiayah, beaming with delight, repaired to the Russian Embassy to announce the favourable progress of the affair. A few days afterwards M. Aristarchi, the Russian dragoman, went to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to suggest, that if the Porte was not inclined to withdraw *its troops*, and *its Commissioner*, it need not "*donner suite*" to the application of the Prince.

Now the Porte transmitted its formal demand for the evacuation, which left Constantinople upon the 15th January. On the 21st, M. Titoff took occasion informally and verbally to communicate to Ali Pasha that the proposal would meet with no obstruction, as he had already received the orders of his Court to make it ! No steamer had that day arrived in the port of Constantinople, no messenger had dismounted at the Russian Embassy ; no communication could have possibly reached M. Titoff for the eight previous days. Such was the result of the inquiry immediately instituted by the Porte.

Either M. Titoff had by anticipation been armed with powers to meet this contingency, or he acted under an unmistakeable necessity presented by the case. To discover that necessity requires no research and involves no speculation ; it is as clear as the sun at noon day. In the Principalities she is detested and her position is next to untenable. The Porte has not been led into any signal error in her management of them, or into any base surrender ; but, on the contrary, and in contradiction to all her past history, has relied on them, backed them, and succeeded in establishing mutual confidence and concert. As to the "*Ultima ratio Regum*," that point is also free from ambiguity. Turkey has now a respectable disciplined force which she never had before since Russians and Turks have met in battle array, and it is Russia's greatest care that the Turks shall have no inducement to weigh the relative strength of the two empires. It must also be ob-

served that the immediate object of the occupation had been accomplished by the subjugation of Hungary. The Russian troops in contact with the Turkish, so much better paid and fed, were being inoculated with disaffection to that degree, that the regiments already relieved, have been dispersed and sent in small bodies to remote stations.

If for these reasons it was requisite to yield—then was it desirable to yield with promptitude and grace. Thus would the occasion of friendly counsel be preserved, the evacuation shorn of its utility to the Porte, and—the door left ajar.

The Turks having themselves seized and sent away the leading men opposed to Russia, the Government is actually in the hands of her partizans; by the withdrawal of the Russian troops the governing jealousy falls on the Porte; Russia can always fire off a revolution, and bring back her army. The evacuation, to be real, must rid the country of a foreign faction as well as of foreign troops. The political evacuation can take place only when the Porte, on withdrawing her soldiers, shall enter with a charter in her hand, and say to the people, this arbitrary and provisional condition shall cease; here is the rule by which you yourselves shall live."

This is what the Porte proposes: this is what Russia has to prevent; by her prompt consent she will be admitted into the Council Chamber, and so will prevent it. Already has the Porte been thrown into doubts and hesitancy, fearing to have fallen into a trap: we thought, say they, that we had

hit them a heavy blow,—they smile and thank us!

Unless the Porte had acted for herself and by herself, this so far fortunate issue could not have been secured; yet as its redoubtable protectors will no doubt arrogate to themselves the merit of her success, the following facts deserve to be stated.

At the critical moment of the negotiation, on the 21st January, the British Ambassador, after having been refused a private audience, at a public audience represented to the Sultan his Ministers as having lost the confidence of England, and being unworthy of that of their master.* As to France, not that her word matters one way or the other, she was sending in an ultimatum, and breathing flames about the Holy Places. Thus Turkey, being relieved from her officious friends, achieved the greatest diplomatic victory which her annals have to record. Alas! for Denmark, she was not equally lucky.

Whilst the troops of Russia's satellite are marching into the Duchies, Russia announces the withdrawal of her own troops from the Principalities! The surrounding populations, at least, will not fail to see in this fact, evidence of strength and resolution in Turkey to resist the pressure of the Power which they all detest and fear. If the barrier pre-

* The day before, the Russian Minister sent to the chiefs of the adverse party, to inform them of the step which next day the English Ambassador would take, and of the language he would hold.

sented to Russia by the Powers of Europe has fallen, another has arisen, where least expected, to supply its place. Venal pens will hardly suffice to attribute the retreat of the Muscovite hordes from the Danube to "the moderation of the Emperor,"—or the activity of that Western diplomacy which has placed the Sound within her grasp.

CONCLUSION.

May, 1852.

As to the evacuation of the Principalities, and the disposal of the Danish succession, the conclusions above stated in January 1850, have been to the letter verified. The succession, is in such a manner disposed of, that no less than three branches and six young men who stood between Russia and the general succession are put out of the way. If now not sufficiently docile, as a nominally independent state, Denmark can be at once absorbed as an inheritance, by the mission of an Orloff or a Jazmaji.

In pretending to unite the successions they have *confused* the lines. They have taken from the families hereditary right—from the Kingdom and Duchies constitutional right. They appear to create a compound right of hereditary and elective, but really substitute their will for law. This decision of the mediators is for the sole benefit of one of them, whose rights of remainder entail are intact, whilst the intervening lines are superseded. This interested party is admitted into the mediation on the grounds of a renunciation of claims, which do not affect the general succession.

As to Prussia, it will now be apparent what role she has played from the beginning.

On the evacuation of the Duchies by the Austrians, a note of Prince Schwartzenburg, expounding the views of the Cabinet of Vienna, has appeared, and we are apprised of the fact that death overtook that statesman at a moment of struggle with Russia. It is therefore possible that the Treaty of the 8th May may be connected with that event. This note* denounces, in terms, the schemes of Copenhagen, and in fact, the pretensions of the Conference: it lays down the maxim, that each portion should maintain its own right and laws: it asserts the necessity of preserving the integrity of the monarchy, but does not assume that the Conference shall usurp this power: it presents that simple view of the case which if taken by the King of Denmark, would have prevented all that has happened.

Austria sees all this in 1852 !† Had she no representative at Copenhagen in 1846—no knowledge of the acts of the Confederation in 1848 ?

Is it not possible that the Danes, who have been hitherto considered a calm and judicious people, at

* This document will be found Appendix No. 2.

† The line taken by the Austrian Cabinet on this occasion may be referable to Mr. Prokesch, its Representative at Berlin. It was no secret that he looked upon all these scenes with distaste; and there can be little doubt that he apprehended their source and purpose. It was not concealed at Berlin, that Russia had interposed to prevent the Austrian Government from sending him as Ambassador to Constantinople.

sight of this additional humiliation, should recover from their frenzy, and turning on the foreigner the animosities which he has so easily kindled between them, at last unite in one dignified act, and give to themselves a king ?

APPENDIX.

No. I.

BATTLE OF ISTED.

(Extracts from a Danish Work.)

“ Le moment décisif de la bataille était arrivé. Depuis quelques instants on s'apercevait qu'il y passait dans le centre de Willisen quelque chose d'extraordinaire. Des divisions entières avaient epuisé leurs provisions de poudre ; on se plaignait que le Général en Chéf ne donnait pas d'ordre ; de temps en temps des soldats de différents bataillons se trainoient péniblement jusqu' auprès des nôtres harassés de fatigue et incapables de continuer le combat. Ils se couchaient par terre ne songeant plus qu'à se reposer et à se rafraîchir. En vain les officiers les exhortaient à marcher. Nous n'avons pas d'ordre à recevoir de vous, répondaient ils. Beaucoup d'autres personnes des environs se joignaient aux officiers pour piquer leur amour propre, en les engageant à aller aux secours de leurs frères d'armes. Oui, disaient ils ; quand nous aurons mangé. Tout semblait devenir de plus en plus contraire à l'armée ennemie. Enfin Willisen apprit que le Colonel Schepelern était à Schuby et menaçait sa ligne de retraite. * * * *

“ Le Colonel Schepelern selon le plan de la bataille se trouvait vers onze heures et demi à Schuby sur les derrières de l'ennemie. On a vu rarement un mouvement circulaire réussir si complètement.”—p. 32.

“ La confiance qu'on avait dans les talents militaires de Willisen était encore si grande dans les rangs de l'armée, que l'aile droite de

l'ennemi qui avait souffert le moins, *prenait la retraite pour un stratagème.* * * * *

“ Les Holsteinois qui d'ailleurs se battaient bravement eux-mêmes, disaient avec raison, ‘ Les Danois ne se battent pas, ils ne font qu'avancer.’ ”

“ Willisen chercha à sauver sa réputation du grand Capitaine en disant que la bataille n'était pas finie. On ne m'a pas fait abandonner ma position par des manœuvres, disait il ; c'est et nous écrasant qu'on nous a fait quitter le champ de bataille.”—p. 39.

“ Après la bataille d'Isted il (Willisen) comprit qu'il avait mal jugé les Danois. Son entourage l'avait forcé malgré ses principes stratégiques de perdre les avantages d'une position défensive pour prendre l'offensive au risque de s'exposer à mille dangers. Et maintenant il était poussé malgré lui vers Missund et Frédérickstadt ; son honneur était engagé il ne pouvait plus s'arrêter.
* * *

“ A Neumynster il fut poursuivi de cris injurieux et reçu à coups de pierres.

“ Le Général Wrangel se trouvait caux aux lorsque la nouvelle de la victoire lui arriva. Il était en compagnie d'une noble famille Danoise, avec laquelle il était très lié. Il fit bonne contenance, félicita les Danois et parla de Willisen *comme d'un homme à qui l'on ne pouvait se fier.*”—Troisième Campagne de Schleswig, racontée par F. HAMMERICH, Chapelain de l'Armée.
(French Translation.)

No. II.

NOTE OF PRINCE SCHWARTZENBURG.

“THE revival of the provincial Diet of Holstein, which His Majesty the King of Denmark has authorised, appears to the Imperial Cabinet both from a general point of view, and in relation to the law of the German Confederation, as a welcome and important turning point in the Danish question. The Danish Ministry can hardly observe the position of Denmark and Europe, at the moment, the future of the nation is about to be settled on a new foundation, without themselves admitting that this wise decision can only be considered a first step towards the restoration of the vital conditions of the Danish Monarchy. The idea of separating Holstein more than formerly from the other parts of the kingdom, and connecting Schleswig so much the more closely with Denmark, contradicts the principle of the integrity of the Monarchy, for which we are prepared to give a new guarantee. This idea does not originate in the demand of the great Powers; it belongs to a system which more or less, in every country, tends to obtaining a new division of the map of Europe, drawn according to the different nationalities. The steps which have been taken to effect this, which have found their expression even in the scheme of organization drawn up by Count Sponneck, and the open or secret end of which is the incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark, belong to the innovations of 1848; and the time appears to have arrived for placing a limit to them, according to real and permanent principles, also for this important part of the north. Schleswig has in all ages formed a connecting link between Denmark and Holstein. In contradiction to the policy followed by the Danish Crown till recently, it is

sought to alienate the institutions of Schleswig from those of Holstein, in order to assimilate them to those of a democratic Denmark, which is a violation of existing rights no less than of the permanent interests of the kingdom. In the part we wish to take in the new establishment of the Danish Monarchy, we cannot, and will not, give up the rights of the German Confederation, and the position it occupies in the political system of Europe. The condition of our participation in an European guarantee are hereby defined:—A common succession to the Throne and political institutions for each part of the kingdom, secured by the unity of the monarchy; no actual or expressed incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark; provincial Diets in Schleswig as in Holstein; and a settlement of the position of Holstein in the German Confederation in such a manner that a friendly relation to Germany may be rendered possible. This is the basis on which alone, according to our sincere conviction, the new edifice of the deeply shaken Danish Monarchy can be erected. Your Excellency will make such use of this despatch as you may think the interest of the cause requires, and at the same time request M. von Der Reedt to place it before His Majesty."

